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Federal pleading standards are in crisis. The Supreme Court's recent
decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal have the
potential to upend civil litigation as we know it. What is urgently needed is a
theory ofpleading that can bring Twombly and Iqbal into alignment with the text
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and a half-century worth of Supreme
Court precedent, while providing a coherent methodology that preserves access
to the courts and allows pleadings to continue to play their appropriate role in
the adjudicative process. This Article provides that theory. It develops a new
paradigm-plain pleading-as an alternative to both notice pleading (which the
pre-Twombly era was widely understood to endorse) and plausibility pleading
(which many read Twombly and Iqbal to endorse). As a functional matter, this
new paradigm is largely consistent with notice pleading, but it stands on firmer
textual footing and avoids some of the conceptual problems that arise when
notice is the exclusive frame of reference.
This approach is able to reconcile Twombly and Iqbal with pre-Twombly
authority. Indeed, a careful reading of Twombly and Iqbal undermines the
conventional wisdom that they require a stricter approach to pleading. First,
Twombly and Iqbal did not overrule the most significant pre-Twombly
authorities. The only aspect ofprior case law that these decisions set aside was a
misunderstood fifty-year-old phrase whose real meaning was never called into
question. Furthermore, Iqbal's two-step analysis confirms that the problematic
plausibility standard employed in Twombly and Iqbal is neither the primary
inquiry at the pleadings phase nor a necessary one. The threshold issue is
whether a crucial allegation in a complaint may be disregarded as "conclusory";
only then does the "plausibility" of an entitlement to relief become dispositive.
While there remains some uncertainty about what conclusory means,
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authoritative pre-Twombly sources-the Federal Rules, their Forms, and
Supreme Court decisions that remain good law-foreclose any definition that
would give courts drastic new powers to disregard allegations at the pleadings
phase.
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INTRODUCTION
Pleading standards are essential to the character of a civil justice system. If
a plaintiff seeking judicial redress is unable to provide an adequate "statement
of the claim" at the pleadings phase,' then that claim is effectively stillborn.
There will be no court-supervised discovery, no ability to present evidence to a
judge or jury, and no hope of obtaining any judicial remedy. The complaint will
be dismissed, without even an obligation on the part of the defendant to admit
or deny the plaintiff's allegations.2 For all intents and purposes, that initial
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring the complaint to contain "a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief').
2. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (authorizing a pre-answer motion to dismiss a claim for
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pleading is the key to the courthouse door. If pleading standards are too strict,
the door becomes impenetrable. But if pleading standards are too lenient,
concerns arise that opportunistic plaintiffs without meritorious claims will force
innocent parties to endure the burdens of litigation and, perhaps, extract a
nuisance settlement from a cost-conscious defendant who would rather pay to
make the case go away.
For the first seventy years of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
pleading standards were widely viewed as "well established" and "relatively
straightforward.",3 But today, federal pleading standards are in crisis, thanks to
two recent Supreme Court decisions-Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly4 in 2007
and Ashcroft v. Iqbal5 in 2009. Before these decisions, federal courts followed
an approach known as notice pleading, because the plaintiff's complaint must
merely "give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests." 6 In Twombly, however, the Supreme Court
appeared to endorse a new paradigm-plausibility pleading7-that would
impose higher burdens on plaintiffs at the pleadings phase. Twombly involved a
massive antitrust class action that hinged on whether the defendants had agreed
amongst themselves to restrain competition. The Court dismissed the claim
because the complaint lacked allegations "plausibly suggesting" that such an
agreement had occurred.8
Twombly has been so influential that it is already among the most
frequently cited Supreme Court decisions of all time.9 It has garnered
"failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted").
3. 5B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1357 (3d ed. 2009) ("The basic principles underlying practice on a Rule
12(b)(6) motion are relatively straightforward and have been well established over the years
by the case law.").
4. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
5. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
6. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). Toward the close of the twentieth
century, judges in the lower federal courts would occasionally attempt to impose stricter
pleading standards. See, e.g., Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45
ARiz. L. REv. 987, 988 (2003) (noting the tendency of some lower federal courts to "impose
non-Rule-based heightened pleading in direct contravention of notice pleading doctrine");
Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 435 (1986) (noting that "fact pleading... seems to be
enjoying a revival in a number of areas in which courts refuse to accept 'conclusory'
allegations as sufficient under the Federal Rules"). But such efforts by lower courts were
consistently rebuffed by the Supreme Court in unequivocal terms. See infra note 37 and
accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., Robert L. Carter, Civil Procedure as a Vindicator of Civil Rights: The
Relevance of Conley v. Gibson in the Era of "Plausibility Pleading," 52 How. L.J. 17
(2008); A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REv. 431 (2008).
8. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-57.
9. As of March 2010, Twombly had been cited in nearly 24,000 federal decisions-
already number seven of all time. See infra app. tbl. 1 (ranking the one hundred most-
frequently-cited Supreme Court cases in terms of citations by federal courts and tribunals).
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considerable scholarly attention as well. 10 The debate over pleading standards
that Twombly inspired has only intensified after last Term's five-to-four
decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal. Relying heavily on Twombly, the Iqbal majority
dismissed a civil rights complaint filed against former Attorney General John
Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert Mueller by a Pakistani man who had been
detained during the weeks following the September 11 th attacks. Iqbal held that
discriminatory animus on the part of Ashcroft and Mueller was "not a plausible
conclusion" in light of the complaint's allegations, emphasizing that the inquiry
into plausibility is "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to
draw on its judicial experience and common sense."
' ' I
Twombly's approach to pleading has been widely criticized as inconsistent
with prior Supreme Court decisions, contrary to the text of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, and having destructive policy consequences in terms of
litigants' access to the federal courts. Concerns about Twombly have been
exacerbated by Iqbal, which eliminated any hope that Twombly might be
narrowly confined to complex antitrust cases. 12 The current discourse,
And that figure is increasing at a remarkable rate of nearly 800 new federal citing decisions
each month. See id. tbl.2. Iqbal is not far behind, having cracked the top one hundred most-
cited Supreme Court decisions in less than ten months on the books (number seventy-six as
of March 2010). Id tbl. 1. lqbal is averaging over 500 new federal citing decisions each
month, id tbl.2, and has been described as "the most significant Supreme Court decision in a
decade for day-to-day litigation in the federal courts." Adam Liptak, Case About 9/11 Could
Lead to a Broad Shift on Civil Lawsuits, N.Y. TiMES, July 21, 2009, at A 10 (quoting attorney
Thomas Goldstein).
10. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court
Access, 94 IOWA L. REV. 873 (2009); Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of
"General Rules," 2009 Wis. L. REV. 535; Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell,
Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821 (2010); Scott Dodson,
Comparative Convergences in Pleading Standards, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 441 (2010); Richard
A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions to Dismiss Become (Disguised)
Summary Judgments, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 61 (2007); Lonny S. Hoffman, Burn Up the
Chaff with Unquenchable Fire: What Two Doctrinal Intersections Can Teach Us About
Judicial Power over Pleadings, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1217 (2008); Allan Ides, Bell Atlantic and
the Principle of Substantive Sufficiency Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2):
Toward a Structured Approach to Federal Pleading Practice, 243 FED. RULES DECISIONS
604 (2006); Joseph A. Seiner, The Trouble with Twombly: A Proposed Pleading Standard
for Employment Discrimination Cases, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1011; Spencer, supra note 7; A.
Benjamin Spencer, Understanding Pleading Doctrine, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2009); Paul
Stancil, Balancing the Pleading Equation, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 90 (2009); Suja A. Thomas,
Why the Motion to Dismiss Is Now Unconstitutional, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1851 (2008); see also
Scott Dodson, Pleading Standards After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 93 VA. L. REV. IN
BRIEF 135 (2007); Z.W. Julius Chen, Note, Following the Leader: Twombly, Pleading
Standards, and Procedural Uniformity, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1431 (2008); Kendall W.
Hannon, Note, Much Ado About Twombly? A Study on the Impact of Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly on 12(b)(6) Motions, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1811 (2008).
11. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950, 1952 (2009).
12. For recent critiques of Iqbal, see, for example, Robert G. Bone, Plausibility
Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REv.
849 (2010); Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 10; Suzette M. Malveaux, Front Loading and
1296 [Vol. 62:1293
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however, threatens to make Iqbal's (and Twombly's) effect on pleading
standards a self-fulfilling prophecy. Iqbal's critics excoriate the Court for
discarding the lenient, pre-Twombly approach. Iqbal's supporters praise the
Court for doing precisely that. 13 But little attention is given to whether this is,
in fact, the correct way to read these cases. 
14
Heavy Lifting: How Pre-Dismissal Discovery Can Address the Detrimental Effect of Iqbal on
Civil Rights Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 65 (2010); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The
Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The Disparate Impact on Civil Rights
and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REv. 517 (2010); A. Benjamin
Spencer, lqbal and the Slide Toward Restrictive Procedure, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 185
(2010); Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion to Dismiss
Under lqbal and Twombly, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 15 (2010); Howard M. Wasserman,
Iqbal, Procedural Mismatches, and Civil Rights Litigation, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 157
(2010); Rakesh Kilaru, Comment, The New Rule 12(b)(6): Twombly, IqbaL and the Paradox
of Pleading, 62 STAN. L. REV. 905 (2010); Gregory P. Joseph, Supreme Court on Federal
Practice 2009, 77 U.S.L. Wk. 2787 (2009); Liptak, supra note 9 (quoting Justice Ginsburg's
comment that Iqbal was dangerous and had "messed up the federal rules" and Professor
Stephen Burbank's comment that it "obviously licenses highly subjective judgments" and "is
a blank check for federal judges to get rid of cases they disfavor"); Tony Mauro, Ashcroft
Ruling Adds Hurdle for Plaintiffs: U.S. Supreme Court Decision in lqbal Could Make It
Easier for Defendants To Dismiss Civil Complaints, NAT'L L.J., May 25, 2009 (quoting
Professor Alan Morrison's comment that lqbal is "very troubling" and attorney Michael
Winger's comment that "I fear [Iqbal] will keep many victims of governmental
discrimination and abuse from ever getting their day in court"); Michael C. Dorf, The
Supreme Court Dismisses a 9/11 Detainee's Civil Lawsuit, FINDLAW WRIT, May 20, 2009,
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20090520.html; Mark Herrmann, James M. Beck &
Stephen B. Burbank, Debate, Plausible Denial: Should Congress Overrule Twombly and
Iqbal?, 158 U. PA. L. REv. PENNUMBRA 141 (2009), http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/
pdfs/PlausibleDenial.pdf (Rebuttal and Closing Statement of Professor Burbank); Elizabeth
Thornburg, Law, Facts and Power, 114 PENN STATIM 1 (2010), available at
http://www.pennstatelawreview.org/114/114%2OPenn%20Statim%201.pdf; see also Posting
of Scott Dodson to Civil Procedure and Federal Courts Blog,
Beyond Twombly, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/civpro/2009/05/
beyond-twombly-by-prof-scott-dodson.html (May 18, 2009); Posting of Alexandra D. Lahav
to Mass Tort Litigation Blog, The Plausible
Pleading Standard, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/mass tort litigation/2009/05/
the-plausible-pleading-standard.html (May 20, 2009); Posting of Howard Wasserman to
PrawfsBlawg, lqbal and the Death of Notice
Pleading: Part 1, http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2009/05/
iqbal-and-the-death-of-notice-pleading-part-i.html (May 18, 2009).
13. See, e.g., Liptak, supra note 9 (stating attorney Mark Herrmann's comment that
Iqbal will allow for the dismissal of cases that otherwise would have subjected defendants to
millions of dollars in discovery costs); Lynn C. Tyler, Recent Supreme Court Decision
Heightens Pleading Standards, Holds Out Hope for Reducing Discovery Costs, 77 U.S.L.W.
2755 (2009); Herrmann, Beck & Burbank, supra note 12 (Opening Statement and Closing
Statement of Herrmann and Beck); Posting of Ashby Jones to Wall Street Journal Law Blog,
Why Defense Lawyers Are Lovin' the Iqbal Decision, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/
2009/05/19/why-defense-lawyers-are-lovin-the-iqbal-decision/tab/article/ (May 19, 2009
13:07 EST); see also Posting of Jim Beck & Mark Herrmann to Drug and Device Law Blog,
In Praise of "Short & Plain" Pleadings After Twombly and Iqbal (May 28, 2009),
http://druganddevicelaw.blogspot.com/2009/05/in-praise-of-short-and-plain-pleadings.html.
14. For two thoughtful attempts to reconcile the post-Twombly and pre-Twombly
May 2010] 1297
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This Article challenges the conventional wisdom that Iqbal and Twombly
run roughshod over a half-century's worth of accumulated wisdom on pleading
standards. When one reads Iqbal and Twombly in tandem with their textual and
precedential context, two principles emerge. First, the most significant pre-
Twombly authorities are still good law. The only aspect of prior case law that
Twombly and Iqbal set aside was a misunderstood fifty-year-old phrase whose
real meaning was never called into question. 15 Second, the primary inquiry at
the pleadings phase is not a claim's "plausibility," but rather whether a
necessary element of a plaintiff's claim is alleged in the form of a "mere legal
conclusion." Indeed, the plausibility inquiry can be avoided entirely. As long as
a complaint contains nonconclusory allegations for every element of a claim for
relief, it passes muster regardless of whether the judge might label the
allegations implausible. Plausibility comes into play only when an allegation
necessary to the planitiff s claim is disregarded as conclusory (or is missing
entirely). The inquiry then becomes whether the remaining, nonconclusory
allegations make it plausible that an actionable claim exists. 16
In short, only conclusoriness is a basis for refusing to accept the truth of an
allegation; implausibility is not. The key question going forward, therefore, is
how to assess whether an allegation may be disregarded as conclusory under
the Iqbal framework. One answer is to define conclusory in transactional
terms: an allegation is conclusory only when it fails to identify adequately the
acts or events that entitle the plaintiff to relief from the defendant. What made
the crucial allegations in Iqbal and Twombly impermissibly "conclusory" were
approaches to pleading, see Bone, supra note 10, at 883 ("Despite these seemingly
contradictory signals, evaluating Twombly's impact on notice pleading is not as difficult as
some critics believe. The Court's signals appear conflicting only if one assumes that
Twombly substantially tightens pleading requirements. But this assumption is incorrect.");
Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REv. 473,474 (2010)
("Rather than decrying Twombly as a radical departure and seeking to overturn it, this Article
instead emphasizes Twombly's connection to prior law and suggests ways in which it can be
tamed."). But cf Bone, supra note 12, at 851 (arguing that "Iqbal's version of plausibility is
significantly stricter than Twombly's" because "Iqbal applies a thick screening model that
aims to screen weak as well as meritless suits, whereas Twombly applies a thin screening
model that aims to screen only truly meritless suits").
15. See infra notes 156-60 and accompanying text (discussing Twombly's treatment of
the statement in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957), that "a complaint should not
be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief').
16. In Iqbal, for example, plausibility became relevant only because the allegation at
paragraph ninety-six of the complaint-that Ashcroft and Mueller "each knew of, condoned,
and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject Plaintiffs to [harsh] conditions of
confinement as a matter of policy, solely on account of their religion, race, and/or national
origin"-was disregarded as conclusory. See infra notes 126-32 and accompanying text. The
Court therefore treated the complaint as making no allegation of discriminatory motive, and
proceeded to inquire whether the remaining allegations-standing alone-plausibly
suggested discriminatory intent. But if paragraph ninety-six had not been disregarded as
conclusory, it would have been accepted as true, without any inquiry into plausibility. See
infra notes 138-42 and accompanying text.
1298 [Vol. 62:1293
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legitimate (though certainly debatable) questions about whether those
allegations were grounded in a series of real-world events. An allegation
cannot, however, be deemed conclusory merely because the truth of that
allegation is not suggested by some other allegation in the complaint. Such an
approach would essentially require pleadings to contain evidentiary support for
the allegations contained therein, which would be flatly inconsistent with pre-
Twombly precedent and the text and structure of the Federal Rules. It would
also be conceptually unworkable, because each new allegation offered to
support an earlier allegation would itself require support; if taken to its logical
extent, an evidentiary approach imposes on courts an endless cascade of inquiry
that can never be satisfied. A transactional-narrative approach, on the other
hand, explains why the familiar exemplars of the notice pleading era are
permissible, 17 but the complaints in Iqbal and Twombly arguably fall short. 18 It
is therefore able to maintain consistency with both the text of the Federal Rules
and the Supreme Court's pre-Twombly pleading decisions, while avoiding the
unfortunate policy consequences that many critics of Twombly and Iqbal fear.
These arguments should not be read as praise for the Court's decisions in
Twombly and Iqbal. At best, Twombly and Iqbal appear to be result-oriented
decisions designed to terminate at the earliest possible stage lawsuits that struck
the majorities as undesirable. 19 And it was irresponsible for the Court to invite
the controversial "plausibility" concept into pleading doctrine in a way that has
led to such widespread confusion. Courts should not, however, compound these
problems by misreading Twombly and Iqbal to drastically change federal
pleading standards going forward.
Part I of this Article describes federal pleading standards before Twombly,
and then summarizes the Supreme Court's reasoning in both Twombly and
Iqbal. Part II describes the conventional understanding that Twombly and Iqbal
make "plausibility" the principal inquiry at the pleadings phase, and argues that
such an approach would indeed be problematic. Part III argues that properly
understood, the post-Iqbal pleading framework is not fundamentally in conflict
with notice pleading, because the most significant pre-Twombly authorities on
federal pleading remain good law and because the troublesome plausibility
standard is rendered irrelevant when a plaintiff provides nonconclusory
allegations for each element of a claim. Part IV focuses on Iqbal's most
pressing doctrinal question-how to determine whether a particular allegation
17. Two such examples are the employment-discrimination complaint in Swierkiewicz
v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002), and the negligence complaint in Form 11 of the
Federal Rules. As explained infra notes 238-42 & 279-86 and accompanying text, these
complaints pass muster because they identify the underlying acts or events (the plaintiff's
firing in Swierkiewicz, the plaintiff being struck by a car in Form 11), even though other
characteristics of those events (the employer's discriminatory intent in Swierkiewicz, the
defendant's negligence in Form 11) are alleged in conclusory fashion.
18. See infra notes 245-66 and accompanying text.
19. See infra Part IID.
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may be disregarded as "conclusory," i.e., a mere legal conclusion. It argues that
defining conclusory in transactional terms would reconcile Twombly and Iqbal
with binding pre-Twombly authority, and rejects the idea that allegations are
conclusory just because they lack evidentiary support at the pleadings phase. It
then proposes a new paradigm-plain pleading-that provides a textual
foundation for this approach. While line-drawing challenges will inevitably
remain, these challenges would persist even under a traditional notice-pleading
framework. Part V develops a deeper theory of the role pleadings ought to play
in civil adjudication, and confronts the relationship between pleading standards
and discovery costs that drives so much of the contemporary debate.
I. FEDERAL PLEADING STANDARDS BEFORE AND AFTER TWOMBLY
The current crisis in federal pleading standards stems in large part from the
inability to reconcile the liberal approach that governed during the first several
decades of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with the seemingly stricter
approach the Supreme Court employed in Twombly and Iqbal. This Part
summarizes the notice pleading standard that characterized the pre-Twombly
era, and then describes in detail the Court's decisions in Twombly and Iqbal.
A. Before Twombly
For more than a half-century, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were
read as adopting an approach to pleading known as notice pleading. This
paradigm was grounded on Rule 8's command that a complaint need only
provide "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.",20 In the landmark case of Conley v. Gibson,21 the Supreme
Court made clear that "the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a
claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim." 22 Rather,
a complaint is sufficient as long as it "give[s] the defendant fair notice of what
the plaintiffs claim is and the grounds upon which it rests."
23
The Court repeatedly stressed that this approach flows directly from the
text of Rule 8. Its unanimous 1993 decision in Leatherman v. Tarrant County
24
held: "Rule 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint include only 'a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.' In Conley
v. Gibson, we said in effect that the Rule meant what it said.",25 The Forms
20. FED. R. Cry. P. 8(a)(2).
21. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
22. Id. at 47.
23. Id.
24. 507 U.S. 163 (1993) (Rehnquist, C.J., writing for a unanimous Court).
25. Id. at 168 (citation omitted). In Leatherman, the plaintiffs had claimed that a
municipality was liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional execution of a search warrant,
alleging that the municipality had failed to adequately train the officers involved. Id. at 165.
1300 [Vol. 62:1293
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provided in the Rules' appendix, which are deemed to "suffice under these
rules and illustrate the simplicity and brevity that these rules contemplate,"
2 6
confirm this lenient approach. One exemplar is Form 11, which provides that a
negligence complaint satisfies Rule 8 by alleging: "On <Date>, at <Place>, the
defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against the plaintiff."
2 7
Just five years before Twombly, the Supreme Court's unanimous decision
in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A. 28 provided a full-throated endorsement of this
approach. Per Justice Thomas, the Court found it sufficient for an employment
discrimination plaintiff to allege that his "age and national origin were
motivating factors in [the defendant's] decision to terminate his
employment."2 9 The inquiry at the pleadings phase is not whether the plaintiff
will ultimately prevail on its claim.30 The inquiry is not whether the plaintiff
has or was likely to uncover evidence to support the allegations in the
complaint. 3 1 Rather, the Court recognized that a plaintiff might need the
The defendants argued that the complaint was insufficient because the failure-to-train
allegation had not been bolstered by additional facts. Id. at 167. The unanimous Court
rejected this attempt to impose greater burdens on plaintiffs at the pleadings phase, citing
Conley's mandate that "the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set
out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim." Id at 168 (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at
47).
26. FED R. Civ. P. 84. Indeed, the chief drafter of the original Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure-Judge Charles Clark-believed that the sample complaints provided in these
forms were "the most important part of the rules" when it comes to illustrating what Rule 8
requires. Charles E. Clark, Pleading Under the Federal Rules, 12 WYO. L.J. 177, 181 (1958)
("What we require [in Rule 8] is a general statement of the case.... We do not require
detail. We require a general statement. How much? Well, the answer is made in what I think
is probably the most important part of the rules so far as this particular topic is concerned,
namely, the Forms.").
27. FED. R. Civ. P. Form 11 ("Complaint for Negligence"), 2. Before the 2007
restyling of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this form appeared as Form 9 and was
drafted slightly differently. See Bell Atil. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 575-76 (2007)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting what was then Form 9: "On June 1, 1936, in a public
highway called Boylston Street in Boston, Massachusetts, defendant negligently drove a
motor vehicle against plaintiff who was then crossing said highway."); Swierkiewicz v.
Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 n.4 (2002) (same).
28. 534 U.S. 506.
29. Amended Complaint at 37, Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., No. 99 Civ. 12272
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2000) [hereinafter Swierkiewicz Amended Complaint]; see also
Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514 ("Petitioner alleged that he had been terminated on account of
his national origin in violation of Title VII and on account of his age in violation of the
ADEA.").
30. See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 515 ("[The federal] pleading standard [is] without
regard to whether a claim will succeed on the merits."); accord Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.
232, 236 (1974) ("When a federal court reviews the sufficiency of a complaint, before the
reception of any evidence either by affidavit or admissions, its task is necessarily a limited
one. The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is
entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.").
31. See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 511-12 (rejecting as "incongruous" with notice
pleading a requirement to allege facts raising an inference of discrimination, because "direct
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discovery process to obtain the evidence he will ultimately use to support the
allegations in the complaint. Therefore, a plaintiff s lack of supporting evidence
at the time the complaint is filed was not fatal-such evidence could be
obtained through discovery. 32 The Swierkiewicz Court was fully aware that this
liberal pleading standard could permit unmeritorious claims to survive the
pleadings phase and trigger the pretrial discovery process.33 But it held that this
approach was mandated by the language of Rule 8; a stricter pleading standard
"'is a result that must be obtained by the process of amending the Federal
Rules, and not by judicial interpretation. "
34
Before Twombly, it was clear that this approach to pleading governed all
actions in federal court, except for a discrete number of issues for which a
stricter standard was explicitly imposed by statute or rule.35 Toward the close
of the twentieth century, judges in the lower federal courts would occasionally
attempt to read Rule 8's general pleading standards more strictly, 36 but such
efforts were consistently rebuffed by the Supreme Court in unequivocal
terms. 37 Then came Twombly.
B. The Twombly Decision
The Supreme Court's 2007 decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
involved an antitrust class action of gargantuan proportions. The plaintiffs
alleged that America's largest telecommunications firms (the so-called "Baby
Bells" or "ILECs" 38) had violated § 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act by
engaging in anticompetitive "parallel conduct"-refusing to compete against
evidence of discrimination" might be unearthed during discovery even though the plaintiff
was concededly "without direct evidence of discrimination at the time of his complaint").
32. See infra notes 228-32 and accompanying text.
33. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514-15 (recognizing that this approach to pleading would
"allow[] lawsuits based on conclusory allegations of discrimination to go forward" but
concluding that "[w]hatever the practical merits of this argument, the Federal Rules do not
contain a heightened pleading standard for employment discrimination suits").
34. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 515 (quoting Leatherman v. Tarrant County, 507 U.S.
163, 168 (1993)).
35. See, e.g., FED. R. CIv. P. 9(b) (requiring that a complaint alleging fraud or mistake
"state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake"); Tellabs, Inc. v.
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007) (applying the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act's special pleading standards for certain securities law claims (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)), which require the complaint to "state with particularity facts giving
rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind").
36. See supra note 6.
37. See, e.g., Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 510-15 (2002) (rejecting lower court's
imposition of heightened pleading standard for employment discrimination claims);
Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 167-68 (rejecting lower court's imposition of heightened pleading
standard for civil rights claims against government officials).
38. Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 549 (2007). ILEC stands for
"Incumbent Local Exchange Carrier." Id.
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one another in their respective regional markets-and by restraining other
potential competitors (the non-Baby Bells or "CLECs" 39) wishing to access
those markets. 40 The markets affected by these alleged violations were so vast
that the plaintiff class would have comprised over ninety percent of everyone in
America who had subscribed to either local telephone or high-speed internet
service.
41
A § 1 Sherman Act claim exists only when the defendants' anticompetitive
behavior is pursuant to a "contract, combination, or conspiracy.' '42 As to this
element, the Twombly complaint stated: "Plaintiffs allege upon information and
belief that [the ILECs] have entered into a contract, combination or conspiracy
to prevent competitive entry in their respective local telephone and/or high
speed internet services markets and have agreed not to compete with one
another and otherwise allocated customers and markets to one another.'A3 The
defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, challenging the adequacy of the
plaintiffs' conspirac allegations.44 The district court granted the motion and
dismissed the case,45 but the Second Circuit reversed. 46 With Justice Souter
writing for the majority, the Supreme Court ruled seven-to-two that the
plaintiffs' complaint was insufficient and must be dismissed.47
The Court recognized the complaint's allegations that there had, in fact,
been a "contract, combination, or conspiracy, ' '48 but it held that "on fair reading
these are merely legal conclusions resting on the prior allegations" of parallel
conduct.49 More was required to comply with federal pleading standards. The
complaint must contain "allegations plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent
with) agreement" 50 or, phrased slightly differently, "facts that are suggestive
enough to render a § 1 conspiracy plausible." 51 The "[f]actual allegations must
be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level."52
Measured by these metrics, the Twombly complaint was insufficient. The
39. CLEC stands for "competitive local exchange carrier." Id.
40. See id. at 550-51.
41. Id. at 559.
42. Id. at 548 ("Liability under § 1 of the Sherman Act requires a 'contract,
combination, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce."' (citation and ellipses
omitted)).
43. Id. at 551 (quoting 51 of the plaintiffs' complaint).
44. See Twombly v. Bell At. Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 174, 176, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
45. Id. at 189.
46. Twombly v. Bell At. Corp., 425 F.3d 99, 119 (2d Cir. 2005).
47. See Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
48. Id. at 551.
49. Id. at 564; see also id. ("[T]he complaint leaves no doubt that plaintiffs rest their
§ 1 claim on descriptions of parallel conduct and not on any independent allegation of actual
agreement among the ILECs.").
50. Id. at 557.
51. Id. at 556.
52. Id. at 555.
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Court gave particular attention to the plaintiffs' allegations that the defendants
had engaged in a "parallel course of conduct" 53 to restrain competition, such as
by "making unfair agreements" with CLECs wishing to access their networks;
by "providing inferior connections to the networks, overcharging, and billing in
ways designed to sabotage the CLECs' relations with their own customers";
and by their "common failure meaningfully to pursue attractive business
opportunities in contiguous markets where they possessed substantial
competitive advantages." 54 The Court noted, however, that antitrust law does
not forbid such parallel conduct that is the product of each actor's "independent
decision" rather than "an agreement, tacit or express," between competitors.
55
Furthermore, such parallel conduct is "a common reaction of firms in a
concentrated market" and entirely consistent with "a wide swath of rational and
competitive business strategy unilaterally prompted by common perceptions of
the market."
56
The Court also expressed concern about the discovery costs that would
result if the plaintiffs' claim in Twombly were allowed to proceed past the
pleadings phase, 57 noting that "antitrust discovery can be expensive" and
worrying that "the threat of discovery expense will push cost-conscious
defendants to settle even anemic cases. ' 58 It added that "it is only by taking
care to require allegations that reach the level suggesting conspiracy that we
can hope to avoid the potentially enormous expense of discovery in cases with
no reasonably founded hope that the discovery process will reveal relevant
evidence." 59 In addition, the Court critiqued and "retire[d] ''60 its statement
from the landmark 1957 decision in Conley v. Gibson that "a complaint should
not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that
the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would
entitle him to relief."61 It declared this phrase to be "best forgotten," 62 fearing
that "a focused and literal reading" of it would mean that "a wholly conclusory
statement of claim would survive a motion to dismiss whenever the pleadings
left open the possibility that a plaintiff might later establish some set of
53. Id. at 551 (quoting plaintiffs' complaint).
54. Id. at 550-51 (internal quotation marks omitted).
55. Id. at 553 (quoting Theatre Enter., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S.
537, 540 (1954)); see also id. at 553-54 ("Even conscious parallelism, a common reaction of
firms in a concentrated market that recognize their shared economic interests and their
interdependence with respect to price and output decisions is not in itself unlawful." (quoting
Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227 (1993)
(internal quotation marks omitted))).
56. Id. at 553-54 (emphasis added) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
57. Id. at 558 (noting that "proceeding to antitrust discovery can be expensive").
58. Id. at 559.
59. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
60. Id. at 563.
61. 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
62. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 (2007).
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undisclosed facts to support recovery."
63
The Court thus concluded that "an allegation of parallel conduct and a bare
assertion of conspiracy will not suffice." 64  Rather, "further factual
enhancement" was required to cross "the line between possibility and
plausibility of entitlement to relief.",65 The Court's final sentence echoed this
notion: "Because the plaintiffs here have not nudged their claims across the line
from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed.,
66
C. Initial Uncertainty Following Twombly
The dismissal of a complaint based on the plaintiffs' failure to "nudge[]
their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible" sent shockwaves
throughout the legal community-for academics, 67 practitioners,68 and
judges69 alike. Many sought ways to confine Twombly to its particular facts.
One theory was that Twombly's approach applied only to complex antitrust
claims, while the more lenient notice pleading approach continued to apply
more generally. 70 Another was that Twombly applied only when the plaintiff
had pled itself out of court by resting its claim on an impermissible theory.
7 1
The idea that Twombly might be narrowly confined gained added purchase
when the Supreme Court issued a per curiam decision in Erickson v. Pardus
72
just two weeks after Twombly. The Erickson opinion used standard pre-
63. Id. at 561 (internal quotation marks omitted).
64. Id. at 556.
65. Id. at 557 (internal quotation marks omitted).
66. Id. at 570.
67. See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 10, at 1224 ("[F]ollowing Twombly's thundering
arrival in 2007, academic interest in the subject [of pleading standards] has been
rekindled."); Spencer, supra note 7, at 431 (describing Twombly as "a startling move by the
U.S. Supreme Court").
68. See, e.g., Gregory P. Joseph, Federal Litigation-Where Did It Go Off Track?,
LITIG., Summer 2008, at 5, 62 ("The Supreme Court also rewrote federal pleading
requirements in 2007, without even amending the pleading rules, by issuing its decision in
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly ... ").
69. See, e.g., Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 155 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting that
"[c]onsiderable uncertainty concerning the standard for assessing the adequacy of pleadings
has recently been created by the Supreme Court's decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly" and that "[s]ome of [Twombly's] signals point toward a new and heightened
pleading standard"), rev'dsub nom. Ashcroft v. lqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
70. See, e.g., Kersenbrock v. Stoneman Cattle Co., No. 07-1044-MLB, 2007 WL
2219288, at *2 n.2 (D. Kan. July 30, 2007) ("[Twombly] deals only with pleading
requirements in the highly complex context of an antitrust conspiracy case. It does not
announce a general retreat from the notice pleading requirement of FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a).").
71. See Ides, supra note 10, at 631-32 ("[T]he problem confronting the [Twombly]
plaintiffs was a self-inflicted wound. In essence, they pled themselves out of court by filing a
complaint that alleged a claim unrecognized by the Sherman Act, namely, a claim of
anticompetitive parallel conduct.").
72. 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam).
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Twombly pleading principles to reverse a lower court's dismissal of a prisoner's
Eighth Amendment claim based on improper medical treatment, without any
inquiry into the "plausibility" of the plaintiff's allegations. 73 Some surmised
that the Court had deliberately "held" the Erickson decision so that it would
come out after Twombly and thereby serve "as a reassurance that [Twombly]
had not altered Rule 8(a)(2) pleading principles."
74
Any hope that Erickson signaled the Supreme Court's willingness to
restrict the scope of Twombly did not last long, however.75 In 2009, three days
shy of Twombly's second anniversary, the Court decided Ashcroft v. Iqbal.76 As
the next Subpart describes, Iqbal removes any doubt that Twombly reflects the
generally applicable pleading standard in federal court.
D. The Iqbal Decision
The Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal divided sharply over the impact of Twombly
on a civil rights lawsuit brought by a Pakistani man whom federal officials had
detained in New York City during the weeks following the September 11 th
attacks. 77 Designated as a "person 'of high interest"' in the September 11 th
investigation, Iqbal alleged that he had been held under harsh and highly
restrictive conditions of confinement at the Administrative Maximum Special
Housing Unit (ADMAX SHU) of the Metropolitan Detention Center in
Brooklyn.7 8 Iqbal's Bivens action challenged several aspects of his detention
and named many government officials as defendants, but the only claims before
the Supreme Court were Iqbal's claims against former Attorney General John
73. Erickson emphasized that "when ruling on a defendant's motion to dismiss, a judge
must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint" and that
"[s]pecific facts are not necessary." Id. at 93-94.
74. Ides, supra note 10, at 638-39 ("[F]rom the available records, it appears that
Erickson was 'held' pending the decision in Bell Atlantic. One gets the sense, given
Erickson's relative lack of 'certworthiness,' that the rapidly prepared and issued Erickson
opinion was written as a reassurance that the Bell Atlantic decision had not altered Rule
8(a)(2) pleading principles.").
75. As a per curiam decision issued without oral argument or merits briefing, it is not
clear how strong Erickson's precedential effect would be in any event. See EUGENE
GRESSMAN, KENNETH S. GELLER, STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO, TIMOTHY S. BISHOP & EDWARD A.
HARTNETT, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 305 & n.94 (9th ed. 2007) (noting that "decisions
explained in a written opinion but rendered without full briefing and argument" are "entitled
to some weight, but to less than fully articulated decisions" and that "[t]his may mean... no
more than that the Justices will follow such holdings when they agree with them, but not
otherwise"); see also id. at 349 ("The most controversial form of summary disposition is a
per curiam opinion that simultaneously grants certiorari and disposes of the merits at some
length .... The parties are given no opportunity to file briefs on the merits or to argue orally
before the Court.").
76. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
77. Id. at 1942.
78. Id. at 1943.
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Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert Mueller.79 These claims were based on a
theory that Ashcroft and Mueller had "adopted an unconstitutional policy that
subjected [Iqbal] to harsh conditions of confinement on account of his race,
religion, or national origin." 80 In a five-four decision, the Court held that
Iqbal's claims against Ashcroft and Mueller did not satisfy federal pleading
standards.
81
The majority began by describing the substantive elements of a Bivens
claim like the one pursued against Ashcroft and Mueller. It clarified that
"Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct
of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior. Because vicarious
liability is inapplicable. . . , a plaintiff must plead that each Government-
official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated
the Constitution." 82  For a constitutional claim based on invidious
discrimination, "the plaintiff must plead and prove that the defendant acted
with discriminatory purpose." 83 Such discriminatory purpose "requires more
than 'intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences.' 84 Rather, the
defendant must act "because of, not merely in spite of, [the action's] adverse
effects upon an identifiable group."
85
Turning to general pleading requirements, the Iqbal majority began by
generously quoting Twombly: "A pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions'
or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.' Nor
does a complaint suffice if it tenders 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further
factual enhancement.' 86 Rather, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
79. Id. at 1942.
80. Id. Iqbal's other claims against Ashcroft and Mueller-including claims for
violation of procedural due process-were dismissed on qualified immunity grounds by the
lower courts. See Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 167-68 (2d Cir. 2007) (directing dismissal of
procedural due process claims).
81. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1943 ("We hold respondent's pleadings are insufficient.").
82. Id. at 1948 (citations omitted).
83. Id.
84. Id. (quoting Pers. Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)).
85. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Feeney, 442
U.S. at 279). Writing for the four dissenters in lqbal, Justice Souter argued that the
majority's analysis overlooked a crucial concession that Ashcroft and Mueller made on the
issue of supervisory liability, under which Ashcroft and Mueller agreed "that they would be
subject to supervisory liability if they 'had actual knowledge of the assertedly discriminatory
nature of the classification of suspects as being "of high interest" and they were deliberately
indifferent to that discrimination."' Id. at 1956 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Brief for the
Petitioners at 50, Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (No. 07-1015)). Justice Souter argued that in light of
"the parties' agreement as to the standard of supervisory liability," the majority should not
have "sua sponte decide[d] the scope of supervisory liability here." Id.
86. Id. at 1949 (quoting Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 557 (2007))
(alteration in original) (citation omitted).
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face. '
8 7
For the Iqbal majority, there was a critical distinction to be drawn between
two types of allegations that might appear in a complaint. On one hand are
"legal conclusions" or "mere conclusory statements." 88 Such allegations may
be ignored when assessing the sufficiency of a complaint. 89 As the majority
explained, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations
contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions"; 90 therefore,
"[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice." 9 1 On the other hand are "factual
allegations" or "well-pleaded facts." 92 These allegations must be assumed true
at the pleading phase.93 The dispositive question is then whether those "well-
pleaded factual allegations"-accepted as true-"plausibly give rise to an
entitlement to relief.",
94
Turning to the plaintiffs claims against Ashcroft and Mueller, the Iqbal
majority focused on the following allegations in the complaint:
(1) Paragraph forty-seven's allegation that "[i]n the months after
September 11, 2001, the Federal Bureau of Investigation ('FBI'), under the
direction of Defendant MUELLER, arrested and detained thousands of Arab
Muslim men ... as part of its investigation of the events of September 11 ."95
(2) Paragraph sixty-nine's allegation that "[t]he policy of holding post-
September-1 Ith detainees in highly restrictive conditions of confinement until
they were 'cleared' by the FBI was approved by Defendants ASHCROFT and
MUELLER in discussions in the weeks after September 11, 2001."96
(3) Paragraph ninety-six's allegation that Ashcroft and Mueller "each knew
of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject Plaintiffs to
[harsh] conditions of confinement as a matter of policy, solely on account of
their relilion, race, and/or national origin and for no legitimate penological
interest."
7
87. lqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1950.
90. id. at 1949.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1950.
93. Id. ("When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their
veracity ... .
94. Id.
95. Second Amended Complaint and Jury Demand 47, Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No.
04-CV-1809, 2005 WL 2375202 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub.
nom. lqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143 (2d. Cir. 2007), rev'd sub nom. Ashcroft v. lqbal, 129 S.
Ct. 1937 (2009) [hereinafter Iqbal Complaint]; see also Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1944, 1951
(quoting paragraph 47 of the Iqbal Complaint).
96. Iqbal Complaint, supra note 95, 69; see also lqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1944, 1951
(quoting lqbal Complaint, supra note 95, 69).
97. Iqbal Complaint, supra note 95, 96; see also Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1944, 1951
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(4) Paragraphs ten and eleven's allegations that Ashcroft "is a principal
architect of the policies and practices challenged here" and Mueller "was
instrumental in the adoption, promulgation, and implementation of the policies
and practices challenged here."
98
The majority found the last two of these allegations (paragraphs ninety-six
and ten through eleven) were "not entitled to the assumption of truth" because
they were "bare assertions, much like the pleading of conspiracy in Twombly,
[that] amount to nothing more than a 'formulaic recitation of the elements' of a
constitutional discrimination claim." 99 It then turned to the other allegations
(paragraphs forty-seven and sixty-nine) "to determine if they plausibly suggest
an entitlement to relief." 100 The majority concluded that the mere fact that
many Arab Muslims had been arrested did not plausibly suggest that those
arrests were the result of "purposeful, invidious discrimination."' 0 1 It wrote:
The September 11 attacks were perpetrated by 19 Arab Muslim hijackers who
counted themselves members in good standing of al Qaeda, an Islamic
fundamentalist group. Al Qaeda was headed by another Arab Muslim-
Osama bin Laden-and composed in large part of his Arab Muslim disciples.
It should come as no surprise that a legitimate policy directing law
enforcement to arrest and detain individuals because of their suspected link to
the attacks would produce a disparate, incidental impact on Arab
Muslims .... 102
The Iqbal majority added that Iqbal's claims against Ashcroft and Mueller
"rest solely on their ostensible 'policy of holding post-September-llth
detainees' in the ADMAX SHU once they were categorized as 'of high
interest."' 10 3 The complaint contained no allegation at all that Ashcroft or
Mueller adopted this policy for discriminatory purposes. 104 And the mere
(quoting Iqbal Complaint, supra note 95, 96). The harsh conditions of confinement were
described earlier in the complaint. See lqbal Complaint, supra note 95, 82-95 (alleging
that lqbal and others had been "kept in solitary confinement, not permitted to leave their
cells for more than one hour each day with few exceptions, verbally and physically abused,
routinely subjected to humiliating and unnecessary strip and body-cavity searches, denied
access to basic medical care, denied access to legal counsel, [and] denied adequate exercise
and nutrition").
98. Iqbal Complaint, supra note 95, TT 10-11; see also Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1944, 1951
(quoting Iqbal Complaint, supra note 95, 10-11).





103. Id. at 1952 (quoting Iqbal Complaint, supra note 95, 9I 69-70); see also id. ("But
even if the complaint's well-pleaded facts give rise to a plausible inference that respondent's
arrest was the result of unconstitutional discrimination, that inference alone would not entitle
respondent to relief. It is important to recall that respondent's complaint challenges neither
the constitutionality of his arrest nor his initial detention in the MDC.").
104. Id. ("[T]he complaint does not show, or even intimate, that petitioners
purposefully housed detainees in the ADMAX SHU due to their race, religion, or national
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adoption of a policy "approving 'restrictive conditions of confinement' for
post-September-il detainees until they were 'cleared by the FBI"" 5 did not
plausibly suggest purposeful discrimination. Therefore, Iqbal's complaint was
insufficient.
In reaching these conclusions, the Iqbal majority effectively put an end to
arguments that might have cabined the Twombly approach to pleading. Most
significantly, it rejected the notion that Twombly should be "limited to
pleadings made in the context of an antitrust dispute."'1 6 The majority wrote:
This argument is not supported by Twombly and is incompatible with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Though Twombly determined the
sufficiency of a complaint sounding in antitrust, the decision was based on our
interpretation and application of Rule 8. That Rule in turn governs the
pleading standard "in all civil actions and proceedings in the United States
district courts."
10 7
It concluded: "Our decision in Twombly expounded the pleading standard for
'all civil actions,' and it applies to antitrust and discrimination suits alike." 10 8
II. PLAUSIBILITY'S PROBLEMS
The conventional wisdom is that Twombly and Iqbal herald a new era for
federal pleading standards; they have discarded the liberal, notice-pleading
paradigm that prevailed for over a half-century in favor of a new paradigm of
plausibility pleading. 10 9 In this regime, a judge may dismiss a claim just
because the allegations strike him or her as implausible-not based on any
testimony or other evidence, but merely by drawing on his or her "judicial
experience and common sense."' 110 The continued vitality of classic pre-
Twombly authorities (e.g., Form 11111 and Swierkiewicz1 12) is in doubt.
origin.").
105. Id. (quoting lqbal Complaint, supra note 95, 69).
106. Id. at 1953.
107. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting FED. R. Crv. P. 1) (citing Bell At. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554-56 & n.3 (2007)).
108. id.
109. See, e.g., Spencer, supra note 7, at 431 ("Notice pleading is dead. Say hello to
plausibility pleading." (footnote omitted)); see also Bone, supra note 10, at 875 ("Many
judges and academic commentators read the decision as overturning fifty years of generous
notice pleading practice .... ).
110. lqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
111. See, e.g., Ides, supra note 10, at 633 ("[I]t is difficult if not impossible to
distinguish between the supposedly sufficient 'negligently drove' allegation in [former]
Form 9 [now Form 11], where no specific facts of negligence are alleged, and the
supposedly inadequate, 'fact-deficient' allegation of an antitrust conspiracy (or any other
type of conspiracy) ...."); see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 576 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(noting that although current Form I l's "asserted ground for relief-namely, the defendant's
negligent driving-would have been called a 'conclusion of law' under the code pleading of
old[,] .... that bare allegation suffices under a system that 'restrict[s] the pleadings to the
task of general notice-giving and invest[s] the deposition-discovery process with a vital role
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The apparent consensus about the effect of Twombly and Iqbal on federal
pleading standards does not, to say the least, entail a broad accord on their
normative desirability. Twombly and Iqbal have earned both high praise and
deep scorn, reflecting the sharp divide over whether, as a policy matter, courts
ought to be able to scrutinize allegations more closely at the pleadings phase.
At the core of this consequentialist debate over pleading standards is a struggle
to balance the costs and benefits of pre-trial discovery. If pleading standards are
too lenient, plaintiffs without meritorious claims could force innocent
defendants to endure the costs of discovery and, perhaps, extract a nuisance
settlement from a defendant who would rather pay the plaintiff to make the
case go away. 113 The need to avoid this situation is a commonly asserted policy
justification for stricter pleading standards. 114 The Twombly majority itself
expressed concern that "the threat of discovery expense" could encourage
"cost-conscious defendants to settle even anemic cases before reaching those
proceedings."1
15
To use the plausibility inquiry employed by Twombly and Iqbal as a pre-
discovery screening device is deeply problematic, however. First, it can thwart
meritorious claims by plaintiffs who, without the discovery process, cannot
obtain the information needed to satisfy the plausibility requirement. 116 For
in the preparation for trial"' (alterations in original) (citation omitted)).
112. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 584-86 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[I]n Swierkiewicz, we
were faced with a case more similar to the present one than the majority will allow."
(citation omitted)); Ides, supra note 10, at 634 ("[A] 'naked' allegation of conspiracy would
appear to be on the same footing as the 'naked' allegation of illicit motive as in
Swierkiewicz."); Spencer, supra note 7, at 477 (arguing that Twombly "promulgate[d] the
very class of pleading standard that it only recently rejected in Swierkiewicz"); see also Beck
& Herrmann, supra note 13 ("[W]e have to conclude (and we're not alone) that Swierkiewicz
was impliedly overruled [by Iqbal]."); Dodson, supra note 12 ("[Iqbal] did not cite to
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., a discrimination case that may now be effectively overruled.").
113. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 10, at 72 (arguing that notice pleading "allows the
plaintiff to extort a positive settlement in a worthless case, by inaugurating extensive
discovery proceedings").
114. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Comment, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV.
635, 638-39 (1989) (noting that the filing of "a sketchy complaint" is sufficient to launch
potentially "abusive discovery"); Epstein, supra note 10, at 71 ("The effort to handle the
problem of too much discovery boils down in practice to the delicate issue of whether Rule
8, which is directed toward securing the sufficiency of the pleadings, can be brought to bear
in cases where the challenge is to the adequacy of the underlying facts."); see also AM.
COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS & INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL Sys., FINAL
REPORT 1, 5 (2009) (expressing "concerns that problems in the civil justice system,
especially those relating to discovery, have resulted in unacceptable delays and prohibitive
expense" and arguing that "[n]otice pleading should be replaced by fact-based pleading");
Beck & Herrmann, supra note 13 ("Liberal discovery is what killed liberal pleading.").
115. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559; see also Bone, supra note 10, at 919 ("[Twombly]
assumes that the cause of meritless filings is asymmetry of discovery costs and the
settlement leverage it confers.").
116. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 519, 589
(1997) (noting that a strict pleading standard "risks screening out meritorious cases when
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many kinds of claims, the crucial information needed to confirm a claim's
"plausibility" will be in the hands or mind of the defendant and, therefore, can
realistically be obtained only through the pretrial discovery process. A
plausibility paradigm would dismiss a claim precisely for lack of such
information and, thereby, prevent that information from ever being
uncovered. 117 Indeed, a defendant could obtain such a dismissal without even
having to deny the truth of the plaintiff's allegations. 118
Relatedly, the argument that stricter pleading standards are needed to avoid
incurring high discovery costs on meritless claims presumes that stricter
pleading standards are, in fact, well-suited to identifying which claims are
meritorious enough to justify the costs of the discovery process.119 This
premise is especially subject to question in light of the guidance the Supreme
Court has so far provided on how courts ought to apply the plausibility
standard-under one articulation, a judge is merely to read the complaint and
investigation costs are too high for plaintiffs to obtain the necessary information before
filing"); Hoffman, supra note 10, at 1263 ("[B]ecause of information asymmetries, when a
heightened pleading standard is imposed, some meritorious cases will not be filed and,
further, some that are filed will be dismissed (or settled for marginal value)."); Spencer,
supra note 7, at 481 ("[P]lausibility pleading rejects potentially valid, meritorious
claims.").
117. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 586-87 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("'[1]n antitrust cases,
where the proof is largely in the hands of the alleged conspirators, dismissals prior to giving
the plaintiff ample opportunity for discovery should be granted very sparingly."' (quoting
Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 746 (1976)) (citation omitted));
Hoffman, supra note 10, at 1261 ("It is not uncommon for information that is needed to
demonstrate the existence of a viable claim to lie solely within the exclusive knowledge and
control of another."); Marcus, supra note 6, at 468 (noting that a plaintiff may be "unable to
provide details because only the defendant possesses such information" and that, therefore,
"[t]o insist on details as a prerequisite to discovery is putting the cart before the horse");
Spencer, supra note 7, at 471 ("[Rlequiring plaintiffs to offer factual allegations that
plausibly suggest liability is a particular burden when key facts are likely obtainable only
through discovery .... ); Adam N. Steinman, What Is the Erie Doctrine? (And What Does It
Mean for the Contemporary Politics of Judicial Federalism?), 84 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 245,
293 (2008) (arguing that plaintiffs might "not have access to the factual information needed
to comply with [stricter] pleading standards" because "[i]n many instances, the primary
conduct that is the basis for the lawsuit generates a situation where factual details ... are
purely in the hands of the defendant").
118. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 572 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the Twombly
complaint was dismissed "without so much as requiring [the defendants] to file an answer
denying that they entered into any agreement").
119. As Charles Clark, the chief drafter of the original Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, put it: "we cannot expect the proof of the case to be made through the pleadings"
because "such proof is really not their function." Charles E. Clark, The New Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure: The Last Phase-Underlying Philosophy Embodied in Some of the Basic
Provisions of the New Procedure, 23 A.B.A. J. 976, 977 (1937); see also Spencer, supra note
7, at 483 ("[P]lausibility pleading assigns to complaints a function they cannot truly
fulfill.... Among the functions that pleadings are most ineffective at fulfilling is providing




then "draw on its judicial experience and common sense" to determine whether
a claim is sufficiently "plausible."' 120 On its own terms, this inquiry places few
constraints on judges and embraces a dangerous amount of subjectivity. 12 1 The
odds of this plausibility test yielding accurate results seem particularly low
when the information needed to firmly gauge a case's merit is in the
defendant's possession and, therefore, inaccessible without recourse to the
discovery process.122
Given the problems inherent in a pleading paradigm fixated on plausibility,
one must ask whether the potentially high costs of discovery can be contained
by other means. They can. As Justice Stevens explained in his Twombly
dissent, federal district courts are endowed with a significant "case-
management arsenal," such that the mere potential for expensive discovery "is
no reason to throw the baby out with the bathwater." 123 The Federal Rules
explicitly allow courts to restrict discovery in order to balance its likely costs
and benefits, 124 although defenders of stricter pleading standards question
whether federal judges are willing to employ these tools. 
125
120. Ashcrofl v. lqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009).
121. As Professor Steve Burbank argued in his recent testimony before the Senate
Judiciary Committee, this approach invites the same form of "cognitive illiberalism" that
scholars have identified elsewhere in the adjudicative process. See Has the Supreme Court
Limited Americans' Access to Courts?: Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Comm.,
111 th Cong. 12-13 (2009), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/
12-02-09%2OBurbank%2OTestimony.pdf (Statement of Steven Burbank (citing Dan M.
Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott
v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REv. 837 (2009))). In their
article coining this term, Professors Kahan, Hoffman, and Braman critique the Supreme
Court's decision in Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007), which granted summary judgment
against a plaintiff who had sued police officers after their pursuit of his vehicle ended in a
crash that caused him serious injuries. Kahan, Hoffman & Braman, supra, at 838-41.
Because the Scott Court based its reasoning on its viewing of a video recording of the car
chase, Kahan, Hoffman, and Braman showed the same video to 1350 individuals. Id. They
concluded that "the Court in Scott was wrong to privilege its own view" of the video, id. at
841, based on their data showing that a viewer's perception varied significantly depending
on the viewer's personal background, experiences, ideology, values, and sociodemographic
characteristics. Id. at 864-8 1. So too is a judge's perception of a claim's plausibility likely to
be shaped by these predispositions, which may not match those of the litigants affected.
Statement of Stephen B. Burbank, supra, at 12-13.
122. See supra notes 116-17; see also Hoffman, supra note 10, at 1261-63 ("Why
should we trust our judgment as to the . . . 'implausibility' of the plaintiff s claims when we
have denied the claimant any opportunity to gather additional facts of wrongdoing that may
otherwise be hidden from view?").
123. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 593-94 n.13 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
124. See FED. R. CIv. P. 16(c)(2)(F) (authorizing the court to "take appropriate action
on... controlling and scheduling discovery"); FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(2) (authorizing the court
to order limitations on discovery).
125. Easterbrook, supra note 114, at 638 ("Judges can do little about impositional
discovery when parties control the legal claims to be presented and conduct the discovery
themselves."); see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 560 n.6 (noting that "the hope of effective
judicial supervision is slim").
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Thus, a tremendous amount is at stake in the struggle to define federal
pleading standards after Twombly and Iqbal. The remainder of this Article
explores this question. Fortunately, a careful reading of Twombly and Iqbal
reveals that plausibility is not in fact the primary inquiry at the pleadings phase.
It is not even a necessary one. When one looks closely at the analytical
structure of the Twombly and Iqbal decisions, along with the textual and
precedential landscape in which they arose, an approach to pleading emerges
that does not create the problems just described.
III. AFTER IQBAL: FIRST PRINCIPLES
Read carefully, Twombly and Iqbal support two core principles that, given
the conventional reaction to these decisions, may seem surprising. First, the
justifiably criticized "plausibility" inquiry is not in fact the primary inquiry at
the pleadings phase. Under Iqbal's two-step framework, the plausibility inquiry
becomes irrelevant if a plaintiff provides nonconclusory allegations for each
element of a claim for relief. Second, the most significant pre-Twombly
authorities on federal pleading standard are still good law in the post-Iqbal era.
These two principles confirm that Iqbal's framework is not in fundamental
conflict with notice pleading. Although many infer from Twombly and Iqbal a
desire by the Court to impose a stricter pleading standard, this Part explains
why the Twombly and Iqbal majorities might have been inclined to dismiss
those particular complaints without abandoning the approach to pleading that
had prevailed for more than a half-century.
A. Beyond Plausibility
Iqbal's analytical structure reveals that plausibility is not the primary issue
when evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint. Rather, plausibility is a
secondary inquiry that need not be undertaken at all if a complaint provides
nonconclusory allegations for each element of a claim for relief.
1. Taking Iqbal's two steps seriously
Iqbal's two-step framework for evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint
proceeds as follows:
(1) Identify allegations that are conclusory, and disregard them for
purposes of determining whether the complaint states a claim for relief.
(2) Determine whether the remaining allegations, accepted as true,
plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief. 
126
This framework confirms that a judge is not supposed to make a freeform
inquiry into whether the allegations in the complaint are "plausible" or
126. See supra notes 88-94 and accompanying text.
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otherwise comport with his or her "judicial experience and common sense."
' 127
Rather, the threshold issue is to identify allegations that may be disregarded
because they are "conclusory."
The Court's treatment of Iqbal's complaint confirms this approach. The
crucial allegation was paragraph ninety-six, which alleged that Ashcroft and
Muller "each knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to
subject Plaintiffs to [harsh] conditions of confinement as a matter of policy,
solely on account of their religion, race, and/or national origin." 128 According
to Iqbal, the problem with this allegation was its "conclusory nature," not its
lack of plausibility. 129 Plausibility came into play only because the Iqbal
majority-by disregarding paragraph 96 as conclusory--excised from the
complaint the allegation of Ashcroft's and Mueller's discriminatory motive. It
therefore treated the complaint as making no allegation of discriminatory
motive, and proceeded to inquire whether the remaining allegations were not
merely "consistent with" but affirmatively suggestive of discriminatory
intent. 130 Under the majority's analytical structure, it was as if the plaintiff had
solely alleged that "thousands of Arab Muslim men" 131 had been detained
following 9/11, and had never alleged discriminatory motive. From this
perspective, the Iqbal majority concluded that the "disparate, incidental impact
on Arab Muslims"--with no valid allegation of actual discriminatory intent-
was not sufficient to "plausibly establish" invidious discrimination.
132
A careful reading of Twombly reveals the same analytical structure.
133
Twombly held that "an allegation of parallel conduct and a bare assertion of
conspiracy will not suffice." 134 Because "a conclusory allegation of agreement
at some unidentified point does not supply facts adequate to show illegality,"'
135
Twombly disregarded the complaint's conspiracy allegation. 136 Only then did
127. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009).
128. Iqbal Complaint, supra note 95, 96; see also supra note 97.
129. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951 ("To be clear, we do not reject these bald allegations on
the ground that they are unrealistic or nonsensical. . . . It is the conclusory nature of
respondent's allegations, rather than their extravagantly fanciful nature, that disentitles them
to the presumption of truth.").
130. Id. ("We next consider the factual allegations in respondent's complaint to
determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief. . . .Taken as true, these
allegations are consistent with petitioners' purposefully designating detainees 'of high
interest' because of their race, religion, or national origin. But given more likely
explanations, they do not plausibly establish this purpose.").
131. Id. (quoting Iqbal Complaint, supra note 95, 47).
132. Id. at 1951-52.
133. See id at 1950 (2009) ("Our decision in Twombly illustrates the two-pronged
approach.").
134. Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (emphasis added).
135. Id. at 557 (emphasis added).
136. See lqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 ("[Twombly] first noted that the plaintiffs' assertion
of an unlawful agreement was a 'legal conclusion' and, as such, was not entitled to the
assumption of truth."). But see Ides, supra note 10, at 635 (arguing that the Twombly holding
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Twombly proceed to inquire whether what remained-namely, the "allegations
of parallel conduct"--had been "placed in a context that raises a suggestion of
a preceding agreement, not merely parallel conduct that could just as well be
independent action."
' 137
Thus, the key allegations in both Iqbal and Twombly were not disregarded
because they were implausible. They were disregarded because they were
conclusory. This forced the Court to inquire whether the allegations that
remained-standing alone-plausibly suggested the existence of a
discriminatory motive (Iqbal) or a conspiracy (Twombly). As long as an
allegation is not conclusory, however, it must be accepted as true for purposes
of determining whether the complaint states a claim for relief, without any
inquiry into whether the allegation itself is "plausible," and without any
opportunity for a judge to override the allegation merely by drawing on his or
her "judicial experience and common sense."
' 138
It follows that when a complaint contains nonconclusory allegations on
every element of a claim for relief, the plausibility issue vanishes completely.
Recall that step two of the Iqbal framework is to determine whether the
nonconclusory allegations, accepted as true, plausibly suggest an entitlement to
relief.139 A complaint that fails to provide nonconclusory allegations on every
element might nonetheless pass muster if it contains enough to plausibly
suggest an entitlement to relief. But a complaint that does provide
nonconclusory allegations on every element of a claim, by definition, exceeds
the threshold of plausibly suggesting an entitlement to relief for purposes of
Iqbal step two. Iqbal made clear that, at the second step, the court must
"assume the[] veracity" of such nonconclusory allegations. 140  If such
"did not in any manner depend on the plaintiffs having stated a 'naked' allegation of
conspiracy").
137. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557.
138. lqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
139. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
140. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (2009). This Article generally uses the term
"nonconclusory" to describe the category of allegations that must be accepted as true at the
pleadings phase after Iqbal. Twombly and Iqbal at times use other terms such as "well-
pleaded" or "factual." See, e.g., id. (noting the Twombly complaint's "well-pleaded,
nonconclusory factual allegation of parallel behavior"). One danger with the term "factual,"
however, is that it could misleadingly suggest a return to what is often known as "fact
pleading." As explained infra note 283 and accompanying text, Twombly and lqbal should
not be read as imposing a traditional fact-pleading or code-pleading regime. The term
"factual" could also transplant onto pleading doctrine the problematic "law-fact distinction"
that has bedeviled other areas of law. Thornburg, supra note 12, at 5 (criticizing Iqbal as
hinging on "label[ing] various issues as law or fact" and noting that "[t]he Supreme Court
itself, in other contexts, has confessed that the law-fact distinction is problematic, calling it
'elusive,' 'slippery,' and 'vexing"'); see also Walter Wheeler Cook, Statements of Fact in
Pleading Under the Codes, 21 COLUM. L. REv. 416, 417 (1921) ("[T]here is no logical
distinction between statements which are grouped by the courts under the phrases
'statements of fact' and 'conclusions of law."'). That said, the choice of labels is not
ultimately dispositive; the terms "nonconclusory," "well-pleaded," and "factual" do not by
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allegations address each element that would be needed to ultimately prove the
plaintiffs claim, then they do more than make an entitlement to relief
"plausible"-they confirm an entitlement to relief, at least for purposes of the
pleadings phase. 141
To illustrate this point, assume that (1) a viable claim depends on
establishing X, and (2) the complaint contains nonconclusory allegations that X
happened. In this situation, the step-two inquiry becomes "Assuming X is true,
is it plausible that X happened?" As a matter of logic, the answer to that
question is always yes. It is more than just plausible that X happened; it is
conclusively established that X happened, albeit by the assumption that step
two itself requires. 142
The idea that implausibility (rather than conclusoriness) is grounds for
disregarding allegations in a complaint is further belied by the numerous
allegations that the Twombly and Iqbal majorities accepted as true at the
pleadings phase. In Twombly, the Court accepted the allegations that the
defendants had indeed engaged in parallel conduct, 14 3 without any inquiry into
whether it was plausible that such parallel conduct had in fact occurred. The
Iqbal majority accepted allegations that "the [FBI], under the direction of
[Mueller], arrested and detained thousands of Arab Muslim men.., as part of
its investigation of the events of September 1i,' 144 and that "[t]he policy of
holding post-September-ilth detainees in highly restrictive conditions of
themselves shed much light on what precisely is required for an allegation to be sufficiently
"nonconclusory," "well-pleaded," or "factual." What is needed, rather, is a deeper
conceptual understanding of the characteristics an allegation must have in order to be
accepted as true at the pleadings phase. This Article confronts this question in Part IV.
141. It is no surprise that the Iqbal majority never says this explicitly, because it
concluded that Iqbal had failed to make nonconclusory allegations on each element of. his
claim. But Justice Souter's dissent, which follows precisely the same doctrinal structure as
the majority, illustrates this idea perfectly. He found that lqbal's allegations were not
"confined to naked legal conclusions" and that those allegations, if true, "are sufficient to
make [Ashcroft and Mueller] liable." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1960 (Souter, J., dissenting). He
concluded: "Iqbal's complaint therefore contains 'enough facts to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face."' Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). In other words, when
nonconclusory allegations "are sufficient to make [defendants] liable," the complaint
"therefore contains 'enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face."' Id.
No secondary inquiry into the plausibility of those nonconclusory allegations is required.
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion does not suggest otherwise; again, the difference is
simply that the majority found the crucial allegations to be conclusory and thus had to turn to
the plausibility inquiry to see whether the claim could nonetheless proceed.
142. Put another way, a court that disregards nonconclusory allegations on plausibility
grounds would be disobeying lqbal step two, because it would not be accepting such
allegations as true.
143. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 565-69; see also Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (noting the
Twombly complaint's "well-pleaded, nonconclusory factual allegation of parallel behavior").
144. Iqbal Complaint, supra note 95, 47; see also Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951 (quoting




confinement until they were 'cleared' by the FBI was approved by [Ashcroft
and Mueller] in discussions in the weeks after September 11, 2001."145 Yet the
Iqbal majority made no inquiry at all into the plausibility of those allegations.
The Court's treatment of these allegations confirms this Article's understanding
of lqbal's two-step framework. The Court accepted these allegations as true
because they were nonconclusory, 146 not because they satisfied the Court's
newfound plausibility test.
Finally, making Twombly and Iqbal's plausibility inquiry a basis for
disregarding allegations would be conceptually unworkable. The plausibility
inquiry accepts a certain set of allegations as true, and then asks whether those
allegations "plausibly suggest" an entitlement to relief.147 To say that an
allegation is implausible under Twombly and Iqbal is just to say that the
allegation is not plausibly suggested by other allegations in the complaint that
are presumed to be true. 148 Because the plausibility inquiry itself presumes the
truth of some allegations, plausibility cannot also be the ex ante method for
determining which allegations do and do not need to be accepted as true. To do
so would create an endless cascade of inquiry that, if taken seriously, can never
be satisfied. Each allegation that might be offered to "plausibly suggest" some
other allegation would itself require support, and so on and so .
2. The irony of the plausibility inquiry
For the reasons described above, Iqbal's two-step framework contradicts
145. Iqbal Complaint, supra note 95, 69; see also Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951 (quoting
the same language from the complaint and describing it as a "factual allegation[]" to be
"[t]aken as true").
146. See supra notes 143-45.
147. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
148. See, e.g., Twombly, 550 U.S. at 566 ("[N]othing contained in the complaint
invests either the action or inaction alleged with a plausible suggestion of conspiracy....
[Niothing in the complaint intimates that the resistance to the upstarts was anything more
than the natural, unilateral reaction of each ILEC intent on keeping its regional dominance."
(emphasis added)).
149. To illustrate the fallacy of making "implausibility" a basis for disregarding
allegations in a complaint, recall the complaint in Twombly. Twombly was dismissed for lack
of sufficient allegations showing that the Baby Bells had agreed not to compete with one
another. See supra Part I.B. Imagine, however, that the complaint had alleged that the CEOs
of each of the Baby Bells reserved a private room at a high-priced restaurant in Bermuda in
January 1996, and then alleged a second-by-second transcript of exactly what was said by
whom at the meeting as they hatched their conspiratorial regime. Surely such allegations, if
accepted as true, would plausibly suggest the existence of a conspiracy. But an open-ended
plausibility inquiry could permit the Court to require further allegations to "plausibly
suggest" the truth of those allegations, and further allegations to "plausibly suggest" the truth
of any additional allegations. This is an unworkable approach. If the plausibility inquiry is
what the Twombly and Iqbal majorities say it is-an assessment of whether certain accepted
allegations raise a sufficient inference of some other condition's truth-then it cannot also be
the test for determining which allegations must and must not be accepted as true.
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the common view that the "plausibility" inquiry gives courts license to
disregard allegations in a complaint. Only conclusoriness is grounds for
refusing to accept an allegation as true (Iqbal step one). Plausibility is grounds
for assuming as true something that is not validly alleged in the complaint
(Iqbal step two). Conclusoriness is destructive; it justifies disregarding an
allegation. Plausibility is generative; it justifies creating an allegation that is not
validly made in the complaint itself (perhaps because it was alleged only in a
conclusory manner).
There is a profound irony in all of this. Properly understood, the
plausibility aspect of Twombly and Iqbal makes the pleading standard more
forgiving, not less. Imagine if the Court had just said: mere legal conclusions
need not be accepted at the pleadings phase; if that eliminates a crucial element
of the claim, then the complaint must be dismissed-even if other allegations
plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief. This would not have been
unprecedented. Lower federal appellate courts had long embraced the idea that
mere legal conclusions need not be accepted as true. 150 By definition, this
approach would be a stricter one than Iqbal, because it would remove entirely
the possibility that the plausibility inquiry could salvage complaints that
otherwise rested on mere legal conclusions. Yet by inviting the term
"plausibility" into the pleading lexicon, the Court has opened the door to a
stricter pleading standard, with all of the problems described above. 1
51
It is crucial, therefore, to read the Twombly and Iqbal decisions carefully.
As explained above, those decisions cannot faithfully be read to make a lack of
"plausibility" grounds for disregarding a complaint's allegations. 152 The real
150. See Achtman v. Kerby, Mclnemey & Squire, LLP, 464 F.3d 328, 337 (2d Cir.
2006) ("[Clonclusory allegations or legal conclusions ... will not suffice to defeat a motion
to dismiss." (citation omitted)); Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 973 (9th
Cir. 2004) ("[T]he court is not required to accept legal conclusions .... "); see also Moya v.
Schollenbarger, 465 F.3d 444, 455 (10th Cir. 2006) (describing "the normal standard we
apply to dismissals generally" as one that "accept[s] as true all well-pleaded facts, as
distinguished from conclusory allegations" (quoting Maher v. Durango Metals, Inc., 144
F.3d 1302, 1304 (10th Cir. 1998))); Rivera-Powell v. N.Y. City Bd. of Elections, 470 F.3d
458, 470 (2d Cir. 2006) (rejecting a "conclusory" allegation).
151. See supra Part II.
152. Even if allegations may not be disregarded for lack of "plausibility" as that
concept is used in Twombly and lqbal, some allegations may be so patently ridiculous that
they should not be presumed true at the pleadings phase. Justice Souter alluded to this idea in
his Iqbal dissent:
Twombly does not require a court at the motion-to-dismiss stage to consider whether the
factual allegations are probably true. We made it clear, on the contrary, that a court must take
the allegations as true, no matter how skeptical the court may be. The sole exception to this
rule lies with allegations that are sufficiently fantastic to defy reality as we know it: claims
about little green men, or the plaintiffs recent trip to Pluto, or experiences in time travel.
That is not what we have here.
Ashcroft v. lqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1959 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added)
(citations omitted). Any such rule, however, would be a separate aspect of pleading doctrine,
not one derived from lqbal's two-step conclusory/plausibility analysis. Justice Souter's point
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impact of Twombly and Iqbal will be a function of how courts distinguish
"mere legal conclusions" (whose truth need not be accepted) from
nonconclusory allegations that are entitled to the presumption of truth. This
Article will confront that question shortly.'53 But first, it challenges another
myth-the idea that Twombly and Iqbal must be read as casting aside pre-
Twombly authority.
B. The Most Significant Pre-Twombly Authorities Remain Good Law
The conventional reading of Twombly and Iqbal assumes that they have
essentially overruled pre-Twombly authorities on federal pleading standards.
154
This view cannot withstand close scrutiny, however. First, the pre-Twombly
regime is founded upon the text of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and
the Court has repeatedly stated that changes to the Rules "must be obtained by
the process of amending the Federal Rules, and not by judicial
interpretation."1 55 Nothing in the reasoning of either Twombly or Iqbal suggests
that the Court has now claimed for itself the power to amend the Rules via its
adjudicative decision making.
Second, even if the Rules could be reasonably interpreted to support the
about "little green men" was not that such allegations should be disregarded as implausible
under Twombly and lqbal; it was to indicate a possible exception to the principle that
nonconclusory allegations must be accepted as true. To Souter, the crucial allegations in
Iqbal were more than "naked legal conclusions," id. at 1960, and thus should have been
accepted as true unless they were of the "little green men" variety (which they weren't). The
lqbal majority's reasoning confirms that such outlandish allegations were not the Court's
concern in Twombly and Iqbal:
To be clear, we do not reject [Iqbal's] bald allegations on the ground that they are unrealistic
or nonsensical. We do not so characterize them any more than the Court in Twombly rejected
the plaintiffs' express allegation ...because it thought that claim too chimerical to be
maintained. It is the conclusory nature of [lqbal's] allegations, rather than their extravagantly
fanciful nature, that disentitles them to the presumption of truth."
Id. at 1951 (majority opinion) (emphasis added). Courts could potentially deal with
allegations that are indeed "unrealistic," "nonsensical," "too chimerical to be maintained," or
"extravagantly fanciful," id., via the rules governing judicial notice. See Clermont &
Yeazell, supra note 10, at 836 & n.57 (arguing that "[d]ismissing a complaint composed of
such allegations would not have been controversial" because "[a] court will disregard an
allegation in a pleading that contradicts a proposition judicially noticed"); see also id. at 857
n. 133 (quoting Professor David Shapiro's proposal to legislatively overrule Iqbal that would
retain courts' power to disregard allegations when "the rules governing judicial notice
require a determination that the allegation is not credible").
153. See infra Part IV.
154. See supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text.
155. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507
U.S. 163, 168 (1993). It follows that there is no power to "overrule" the Federal Rules'
Forms (including, for example, Form 11), because these Forms are binding as a matter of
positive law via the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See supra note 26 and accompanying
text (explaining how the Rules themselves provide that the Forms "suffice under these rules
and illustrate the simplicity and brevity that these rules contemplate").
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stricter pleading standard that many find in Twombly and Iqbal, neither
decision purports to overrule the most important aspects of the Court's pre-
Twombly case law. There is only a single instance where either Twombly or
Iqbal explicitly abrogates earlier precedent; Twombly put into "retirement" the
statement from Conley v. Gibson 56 that "a complaint should not be dismissed
for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to
relief."157 The Twombly majority read this "beyond doubt.., no set of facts"
language as precluding dismissal "whenever the pleadings left open the
possibility that a plaintiff might later establish some set of undisclosed facts to
support recovery."' 158 Read this way, Conley's phrase is indeed problematic. As
Professor Richard Marcus once asked, "How can a court ever be certain that a
plaintiff will prove no set of facts entitling him to relief?."159 If that were truly
the test, a complaint that alleged nothing more than "The planet Earth is round"
would survive, because any number of actionable facts might be consistent with
the Earth being round. That the Twombly majority "retire[d]" this view should
not be cause for concern.160
To be fair to Justice Black and his Conley opinion, this now-discredited
phrase was subject to a far more sensible reading. 16 1 It did not preclude
dismissal as long as any set of facts could entitle the plaintiff to relief (the straw
man that Twombly purported to strike down). Rather, this phrase merely
confirmed that speculation about the provability of a claim is typically not a
proper inquiry at the pleadings phase; provability is relevant only when it
appears "beyond doubt" that the plaintiff cannot prove her claim. 162 But the
156. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
157. Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 546, 563 (2007) (quoting Conley, 355
U.S. at 45-46); see also id. at 563 ("The phrase is best forgotten .... ); Spencer, supra note
7, at 463 (stating that Twombly "attempted to isolate and discredit only [Conley's] 'no set of
facts' language while simultaneously purporting to retain the notice pleading system largely
intact").
158. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Twombly
Court's analysis of Conley's "no set of facts" phrase further confirms that, as discussed
above in Part III.A, the principal concern is "conclusory" allegations, rather than not
implausible ones. See id. ("On such a focused and literal reading ... a wholly conclusory
statement of claim would survive a motion to dismiss whenever the pleadings left open the
possibility that a plaintiff might later establish some set of undisclosed facts to support
recovery." (emphasis added)).
159. Marcus, supra note 6, at 434 (emphasis added).
160. See also Ides, supra note 10, at 629 (calling Twombly's treatment of the no-set-of-
facts language a "sensible 'revision' of Conley").
161. Cf Twombly, 550 U.S. at 577 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("If Conley's 'no set of
facts' language is to be interred, let it not be without a eulogy.").
162. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 583 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Conley's statement that a
complaint is not to be dismissed unless 'no set of facts' in support thereof would entitle the
plaintiff to relief is hardly 'puzzling.' It reflects a philosophy that, unlike in the days of code
pleading, separating the wheat from the chaff is a task assigned to the pretrial and trial
process." (citation omitted)).
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Twombly majority itself endorsed this idea; it wrote that "a well-pleaded
complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of
those facts is improbable, and that a recovery is very remote and unlikely."'
163
The dispositive question is-and always has been-what makes a complaint
"well-pleaded"? 1 4 Conley and Twombly provide precisely the same answer:
"[A]I1 the Rules require is 'a short and plain statement of the claim' that will
give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiffs claim is and the grounds
upon which it rests." 165 Twombly not only endorsed this crucial "fair notice"
language from Conley; it also relied on many of the Court's other pre-Twombly
cases, including the unanimous Swierkiewicz decision from just five years
earlier. 
166
One federal appellate court has reasoned that Twombly's disavowal of
Conley's "no set of facts" language effectively overrules pre-Twombly
decisions, including Swierkiewicz, that had relied on Conley.167 This logic is
deeply flawed, however, and misunderstands the Court's reasoning in both
Swierkiewicz and Twombly. Although Swierkiewicz did cite a post-Conley case
that paraphrased Conley's "no set of facts" language, 168 it did not read this
phrase in the overly "focused and literal" way that Twombly rejected.16 9 In fact,
the phrase played no role at all in the Court's application of the federal pleading
standard to Swierkiewicz's complaint. Rather, Swierkiewicz based its holding
explicitly on Conley's fair-notice principle17 0-- the same principle that
163. Id. at 556 (majority opinion) (citation omitted).
164. Id.
165. Conley, 355 U.S. at 47 (emphasis added) (citing FED. R. CIv. P. 8(a)(2)); see also
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 ("Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only 'a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to
'give the defendant fair notice of what the... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests."'
(quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 47) (alteration in original)).
166. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56 & n.3 (citing prior Supreme Court pleading
decisions, for example, Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002), and Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974)). The Court's Swierkiewicz decision is described supra notes
28-34 and accompanying text.
167. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009) (noting that
"Swierkiewicz is based, in part, on Conley" and concluding: "because Conley has been
specifically repudiated ... so too has Swierkiewicz, at least insofar as it concerns pleading
requirements and relies on Conley"). Despite this conclusion, the Third Circuit ultimately
reversed the lower court's dismissal of the Fowler complaint. Id at 211-14. In fact, Fowler's
application of Twombly and Iqbal shows a remarkable sensitivity to the principles underlying
Swierkiewicz and other aspects of the pre-Twombly regime. See infra notes 300-04.
168. See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514 (citing Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S.
69, 73 (1984)).
169. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561.
170. See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514 ("[P]etitioner's complaint easily satisfies the
requirements of Rule 8(a) because it gives respondent fair notice of the basis for petitioner's
claims."); id ("The[] allegations give respondent fair notice of what petitioner's claims are
and the grounds upon which they rest. See Conley, [355 U.S.] at 47.").
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Twombly itself endorsed. 17 1 Twombly's rejection of Conley's "no set of facts"
language, therefore, cannot possibly constitute a rejection of the entire Conley
decision and all decisions that rely on it.
172
Nonetheless, one might argue that the reasoning in Twombly and Iqbal is in
such profound conflict with prior precedent that lower courts ought to deem the
earlier cases to have been implicitly overruled. 173 But this reading would flout
the Supreme Court's repeated instruction that only it has "the prerogative of
overruling its own decisions."' 174 The upshot is that lower courts have,
essentially, a duty to reconcile Twombly and Iqbal with pre-Twombly case law.
To do otherwise would be to overrule pre-Twombly Supreme Court decisions
and, thereby, usurp the Supreme Court's "prerogative,"
175
171. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
172. To accept the logic that Twombly repudiated any decision that relied on Conley
would lead to the paradoxical conclusion that Twombly repudiated itself, because Twombly
also relied on Conley.
173. See supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text.
174. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997) (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989)); see also id. at 238 (noting that the
district court was "correct to recognize that the motion had to be denied unless and until this
Court reinterpreted the binding precedent"); Scheiber v. Dolby Labs., Inc., 293 F.3d 1014,
1018 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, J.) ("[W]e have no authority to overrule a Supreme Court
decision no matter . . . how out of touch with the Supreme Court's current thinking the
decision seems."); Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 58 (lst Cir. 1999)
("Scholarly debate about the continuing viability of a Supreme Court opinion does not, of
course, excuse the lower federal courts from applying that opinion."), affid sub nom. Crosby
v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000); cf Ides, supra note 10, at 635 ("Of
course, the Court is free to overrule any line of cases, but in the absence of an express
overruling one should at least be circumspect in concluding that the execution has
occurred.").
175. Stare decisis would also require the Supreme Court to try to reconcile its prior
decisions if it were to revisit this issue in a later case. See Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs,
498 U.S. 89, 99-100 (1990) (White, J., concurring) ("[T]he doctrine of stare decisis demands
that we attempt to reconcile our prior decisions rather than hastily overrule some of them.");
Ex parte Harding, 219 U.S. 363, 369-70, 378 (1911) (noting an "apparent conflict between
certain decided cases" and concluding that "[w]e must ... reconcile the cases [unless] this
cannot be done"). Although "stare decisis is not an inexorable command," Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (citation omitted), to deviate from the
holdings in pre-Twombly cases (for example, Swierkiewicz and Leatherman) in some future
case would require a justification more compelling than "a present doctrinal disposition to
come out differently from the [earlier] Court," id. at 864. The need to respect stare decisis is
especially strong in cases where the precedent is based on the interpretation of sub-
constitutional law such as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Hilton v. S.C. Pub. Rys.
Comm'n, 501 U.S. 197, 202 (1991) (noting that "[c]onsiderations of stare decisis have
special force in the area of statutory interpretation," especially in a case where "Congress has
had almost 30 years in which it could have corrected our [earlier] decision ... if it disagreed
with it, and has not chosen to do so" (internal quotations omitted)); see also Spencer, supra
note 7, at 462 (arguing that the justifications for strong stare decisis with respect to judicial
interpretation of statutes "apply with like force" to judicial interpretation of the Federal
Rules).
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C. Is Notice Pleading Dead, or Merely Recast?
The two previous Subparts show why (a) key notice-pleading precedents
remain good law after Iqbal, and (b) the "plausibility" of a plaintiffs
allegations becomes irrelevant where the complaint provides nonconclusory
allegations on each element of a valid claim. Although Twombly and Iqbal
recognize a judge's power to disregard "conclusory" allegations at the
pleadings phase, this does not necessarily constitute a drastic shift from notice
pleading. Even before Twombly, the notice-pleading paradigm gave judges
some power to disregard allegations in a complaint. An allegation that "the
defendant violated the plaintiffs legal rights in a way that entitles the plaintiff
to relief' would not have been accepted as true before Twombly; nor would
allegations stating merely that "the defendant violated the plaintiffs rights
under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act" or that "the defendant breached a
duty owed to the plaintiff under state law and this breach proximately caused
damages to the plaintiff."
Under a notice-pleading framework, the problem with such allegations is
that they fail to provide "fair notice of what the plaintiffs claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests." 176 But that begs the question of what constitutes
"fair notice." This ambiguity is precisely why Charles Clark never warmed to
couching his pleading standard in terms of notice. He wrote:
The usual modem expression, at least of text writers, is to refer to the notice
function of pleadings; notice of the case to the parties, the court, and the
persons interested. This is a sound approach so far as it goes; but content must
still be given to the word "notice. " It cannot be defined so literally as to mean
all the details of the parties' claims, or else the rule is no advance.'77
Judge Clark's observation confirms that a notice-pleading framework is not
inherently a lenient one. It depends on what "content [is] given to the word
'notice."' 178 Likewise, a pleading standard that allows courts to disregard
conclusory allegations is not inherently a strict one. It depends on how
"conclusory" is defined.
Accordingly, Iqbal's recognition that conclusory allegations need not be
accepted as true does not necessarily mean the end of notice pleading. 179 It
176. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957).
177. Charles E. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 FED. RULES DECISIONs 456, 460 (1943)
(emphasis added).
178. Id.
179. See Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009) (rejecting the argument
"that Twombly had repudiated the general notice-pleading regime of Rule 8"). The Brooks
court concludes:
This court took Twombly and Erickson together to mean that at some point the factual detail
in a complaint may be so sketchy that the complaint does not provide the type of notice of the
claim to which the defendant is entitled under Rule 8.
This continues to be the case after Iqbal.
Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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merely cloaks the notice inquiry in different doctrinal garb. Any approach to
pleading that permits a court to disregard allegations that lack some
information the court deems necessary can be couched in terms of notice. To
say that an allegation is "conclusory" because it lacks X is no different than
saying that "fair notice" requires the defendant to be informed of X.
The need to define "conclusory" in the post-Iqbal era forces courts to
confront the crucial question: what, exactly, must a complaint contain in order
for a particular allegation to be accepted as true? But that question was always
lurking in the uncertainty surrounding what Conley's "fair notice" standard
actually required. 180 Thus, Iqbal's two-part test does not necessarily entail a
stricter approach, even though it explicitly recognizes the ability of courts to
disregard conclusory allegations. Again, Twombly itself endorsed Conley's fair
notice standard.
18 1
D. An Explanatory Theory of Twombly and Iqbal
To some, the argument that Twombly and Iqbal should be read to preserve
a lenient approach to pleading will sound naive. One reason the conventional
reading of Twombly and Iqbal has gained such solid purchase is that it fits the
recent tendency of the federal judiciary (and the Supreme Court in particular) to
favor defendants, especially corporate and business interests, in civil
litigation. 182 From this perspective, Twombly and Iqbal appear to be more of
the same: the Court gave defendants one more tool for thwarting civil
accountability by discarding the long-established, liberal pleading framework
that was among the most notable aspects of the original Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
180. Some empirical studies reveal an increase in dismissal rates in the years since
Twombly and the months since Iqbal, but they also reveal a remarkably high dismissal rate
under the ostensibly lenient pre-Twombly pleading regime. See, e.g., Patricia W. Hatamyar,
The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REv. 553,
556 (2010) (presenting data suggesting that the dismissal rate was forty-six percent during
the two years prior to Twombly, forty-eight percent during the two years between Twombly
and lqbal, and fifty-six percent after Iqbal). This suggests that even Conley's "fair notice"
standard was sufficiently malleable to permit frequent dismissals at the pleadings phase. See
supra note 6.
181. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
182. See, e.g., Steinman, supra note 117, at 297 & 302 n.307 (noting "the conventional
wisdom that plaintiffs fare better in state court and defendants fare better in federal court"
and citing authority that the Roberts Court "has quickly gained a strong pro-business
reputation"). For empirical data, see Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case
Outcomes Really Reveal Anything About the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal
Jurisdiction, 83 CORMELL L. REV. 581, 596 (1998) (noting a very low percentage of plaintiff
win rates in removed cases and a significantly higher plaintiff win rate in cases adjudicated
originally in federal courts); Thomas E. Willging & Shannon R. Wheatman, Attorney Choice
of Forum in Class Action Litigation: What Difference Does It Make?, 81 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 591, 638-40 (2006) (describing higher median recoveries and attorneys fees in state
court class actions than in federal court class actions).
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One should proceed with caution, however, before translating the Court's
recent pro-defendant leanings into a desire to wholly overturn the pre-Twombly
approach to pleading, especially given the Court's decision to leave the core
precedents of the notice-pleading era in place. 183 The composition of the
Twombly and Iqbal Court was largely the same as the one that unanimously,
per Justice Thomas, decided Swierkiewicz just five years earlier. The
Twombly/Iqbal Court's failure to challenge such pre-Twombly cases is
particularly notable because this Court was in an overruling mood-it was
perfectly willing to "retire[]" Conley v. Gibson's "no set of facts" language,
declaring it to be "best forgotten."' 8 4 That the Court did not similarly retire
either Swierkiewicz or Conley's "fair notice" principle speaks volumes.
An alternative narrative-to the extent one is necessary 185-would
emphasize the precise facts of Twombly and Iqbal rather than a broader
doctrinal agenda. Indeed, Twombly and Iqbal were each rather exceptional
cases. Twombly presented a monstrously large class action that, in the Supreme
Court's own words, pitted "a putative class of at least 90 percent of all
subscribers to local telephone or high-speed Internet service in the continental
United States" against "America's largest telecommunications firms (with
many thousands of employees generating reams and gigabytes of business
records) for unspecified (if any) instances of antitrust violations that allegedly
occurred over a period of seven years." 186 Moreover, the plaintiff class in
Twombly was represented by the Milberg Weiss law firm,187 which had been
indicted by federal prosecutors just one month before the Supreme Court
granted certiorari. 188 Iqbal involved an action by a Pakistani man convicted of
immigration-document fraud who was seeking not merely injunctive relief but
monetary damages against the two highest-ranking law enforcement officials in
the land-the Attorney General and the FBI Director. And it challenged their
efforts on behalf of the federal government in response to, as the Court put it,
"a national and international security emergency unprecedented in the history
of the American Republic."
189
183. See supra notes 156-66 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
185. Speculation about whether a broader agenda might motivate the Court to make
future changes in any given area of law cannot constitute a binding aspect of the Court's case
law. The Court's current decisions are binding, not anticipated future decisions or a general
sense of the Court's underlying motivations. The principle that lower courts must not decide
for themselves that earlier Supreme Court decisions have been implicitly overruled confirms
this. See supra notes 173-75 and accompanying text.
186. Bell Atd. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007).
187. Id. at 547.
188. See Julie Creswell, U.S. Indictment for Big Law Firm in Class Actions, N.Y.
TIMES, May 19, 2006, at Al. See generally Lisa L. Casey, Class Action Criminality, 34 J.
CoRp. L. 153 (2008).
189. Ashcroft v. lqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. lqbal, 490
F.3d 143, 179 (2007) (Cabranes, J., concurring)); see also Richard Bernstein, Threats and
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One can legitimately question whether any of this ought to matter from a
jurisprudential standpoint. But it would not be surprising that some jurists
might lean toward dismissing cases like Twombly and Iqbal without also
wanting to upend pleading standards generally. 190 The Court's own language
reflects the extraordinary nature of those cases. 19 1 The upshot is that the
Supreme Court might indeed be receptive to an approach that brings Twombly
and Iqbal into alignment with the pre-Twombly regime. 19 2 In any event, from
the lower courts' perspective, speculation about whether the Court might
overrule significant pre-Twombly precedents in the future is improper. As
explained above, only the Supreme Court has the prerogative of overruling its
own decisions.
19 3
Responses: Pieces of a Puzzle; On Plotters" Path to US., a Stop at bin Laden Camp, N.Y.
TIMEs, Sept. 10, 2002, at Al (calling the 9/11 attacks "the deadliest foreign attack on
American soil").
190. This is precisely why it is often said-per Justice Holmes-that "hard cases make
bad law." N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting). A
corollary to this maxim might be that one should not read a hard case to make bad law (or to
overrule prior case law) if that reading can be avoided. See also supra Part 1I.B (explaining
why lower courts should not read Twombly and lqbal as implicitly overruling the Supreme
Court's pre-Twombly pleading precedent).
191. See supra notes 186 & 189 and accompanying text. Indeed, the Court's concerns
about the burdens of discovery in Twombly and Iqbal are closely tied to the factual context
of those cases. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953 (noting that avoiding the burdens of "disruptive
discovery" is "especially important" in a case where the "Government officials are charged
with responding to... a national and international security emergency unprecedented in the
history of the American Republic" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at
1954 (noting that the lower court's "promise[] [of] minimally intrusive discovery ...
provides especially cold comfort in this pleading context, where we are impelled to give real
content to the concept of qualified immunity for high-level officials who must be neither
deterred nor detracted from the vigorous performance of their duties"); Twombly, 550 U.S. at
558 (noting that "proceeding to antitrust discovery can be expensive" (emphasis added)); id
at 559 (emphasizing that the Twombly defendants in particular have "many thousands of
employees generating reams and gigabytes of business records").
192. An analogy might be drawn to two blockbuster constitutional-law opinions from
last decade-Lopez and Morrison-that appeared to place new limits on Congress' power to
legislate under the Commerce Clause. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000);
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). Lopez and Morrison were thought to reflect a
paradigm shift in the Supreme Court's view of Congressional power. See, e.g., Richard W.
Garnett, The New Federalism, the Spending Power, and Federal Criminal Law, 89 CORNELL
L. REv. 1, 11-13 (2003) (describing a federalism "revival" under the Rehnquist Court that
included Commerce Clause decisions such as Lopez and Morrison). But when the Court
revisited the issue a few years later, its approach seemed far more consistent with the long-
standing pre-Lopez view. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (upholding Congress'
power to criminalize the possession of marijuana for medicinal purposes); David A. Strauss,
The Modernizing Mission of Judicial Review, 76 U. CHL L. REv. 859, 889-90 (2009) (noting
that Lopez and Morrison "left the door open for the Court to retreat-as it arguably did, in
Gonzales v. Raich"); see also Lino A. Graglia, Lopez, Morrison, and Raich: Federalism in
the Rehnquist Court, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 761, 780-85 (2008) (arguing that the
Court's decision in Raich had "halted, if not reversed" the "Lopez revolution").
193. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
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IV. TOWARD A NEW PARADIGM: PLAIN PLEADING
The question that has consistently plagued pleading standards is simple to
state but hard to answer: when may a court disregard allegations in a complaint
that, if accepted as true, would show that the plaintiff is entitled to relief?. In
doctrinal terms, this now boils down to how to define the term "conclusory" for
purposes of Iqbal step one.1 94 This Part begins to confront this question. It first
considers and rejects a common misreading of the Court's approach in
Twombly and Iqbal, that is, the idea that a complaint must somehow provide
evidentiary support for its allegations. It then argues that conclusory should be
defined in transactional terms, as explained in greater detail below, and that this
understanding reconciles Twombly and lqbal with equally authoritative texts
and precedents. This Part also provides a textual foundation for this approach-
a paradigm called "plain pleading" that is grounded in Rule 8's requirement of
a "short andplain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief." '195
A. Misreading Twombly and Lqbal: Allegations Do Not Require Evidentiary
Support at the Pleadings Phase
One common misreading of Twombly and Iqbal is that they require a
complaint to contain evidentiary support for its allegations. This view would
allow a court to disregard an allegation just because its truth is not suggested by
some other allegation. This approach may reflect the misperception that
allegations may be disregarded for lack of "plausibility." It is certainly fair to
describe the plausibility test that occurs at Iqbal step two as a kind of
evidentiary-sufficiency inquiry. 196 As explained above, however, a lack of
plausibility is not grounds for disregarding a complaint's allegation. 19 7 Only
conclusory allegations may be disregarded. Although courts in other contexts
suggest that what makes an assertion "conclusory" is a lack of supporting
194. See supra note 126 and accompanying text (describing Iqbal's two steps).
195. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added).
196. See lqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951-52 ("On the facts respondent alleges the arrests
Mueller oversaw were likely lawful and justified by his nondiscriminatory intent to detain
aliens who were illegally present in the United States and who had potential connections to
those who committed terrorist acts. As between that obvious alternative explanation for the
arrests, and the purposeful, invidious discrimination respondent asks us to infer,
discrimination is not a plausible conclusion." (internal quotations and citations omitted));
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554 (noting that "we have previously hedged against false inferences
from identical behavior at a number of points in the trial sequence"); id. at 556 ("Asking for
plausible grounds to infer an agreement does not impose a probability requirement at the
pleading stage; it simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that
discovery will reveal evidence."); id. at 566 ("[T]here is no reason to infer that the
companies had agreed among themselves to do what was only natural anyway.").
197. See supra Part III.A.
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evidence, 198 transplanting this attitude to the pleading phase would be
problematic for several reasons.
The most damning indictment of such an approach comes from the Court's
own reasoning in Twombly and Iqbal. As explained above, 199 those decisions
accepted some allegations without regard to whether their truth was suggested
by additional allegations in the complaint. In Twombly, the Court deemed
sufficiently nonconclusory the complaint's allegations that the defendants had
indeed engaged in parallel conduct,20 0 without any inquiry into whether
additional allegations supported their truth. The problem, according to the
Twombly majority, was merely that those allegations failed to plausibly suggest
the existence of a conspiracy. 20 1 Similarly, the Iqbal majority accepted as
nonconclusory the complaint's allegations that "the [FBI], under the direction
of. . . Mueller, arrested and detained thousands of Arab Muslim men.., as
part of its investigation of the events of September 11," 202 and that "[t]he
policy of holding post-September-11 th detainees in highly restrictive conditions
of confinement until they were 'cleared' by the FBI was approved by . . .
Ashcroft and Mueller in discussions in the weeks after September 11, 2001.",203
In doing so, the Iqbal majority made no inquiry at all into whether additional
allegations supported the truth of these allegations.
Under the Federal Rules, the very nature of a complaint makes it
conceptually unworkable to insist that allegations be buttressed by supporting
evidence at the pleadings phase. A complaint's "statement" 20 4 contains merely
"allegations" 205 listed in "numbered paragraphs" 2 06-not the underlying
evidence in support of each allegation. In this sense, every allegation in a
complaint could be deemed conclusory for lack of supporting evidence,
because by definition the complaint contains solely allegations. If a court were
to take seriously the idea that allegations may be disregarded because the
complaint does not also provide evidentiary support for them, then supporting
an allegation with more allegations will never be enough.20 7 Each new
198. See, e.g., Klein v. Ryan, 847 F.2d 368, 374 (7th Cir. 1988) ("[W]e need not accept
conclusory allegations completely lacking evidentiary support.").
199. See supra notes 143-49 and accompanying text.
200. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 565-69; see also Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (noting the
Twombly complaint's "well-pleaded, nonconclusory factual allegation of parallel behavior").
201. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
202. Iqbal Complaint, supra note 95, 47; see also lqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951 (quoting
same and describing it as a "factual allegation" to be "[t]aken as true").
203. Iqbal Complaint, supra note 95, 69; see also Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951 (quoting
same and describing it as a "factual allegation" to be "[t]aken as true").
204. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
205. FED. R. Cfv. P. 8(b)(1)(B); accord FED. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1) ("Each allegation must
be simple, concise, and direct.").
206. FED. R. Civ. P. 10(b).
207. This conceptual problem does not arise for heightened pleading standards like the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), which requires supporting allegations
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allegation offered to support an earlier allegation would itself require support,
and so on and so on. Thus, the existence of evidentiary support for any given
allegation cannot be the test for determining whether an allegation should be
accepted as true. At some point, a court must be able to accept the allegations
in a complaint at face value, and leave the presence or lack of evidentiary
support for later in the proceedings.
20 8
Reading Rule 8's general pleading standard as mandating an evidentiary
approach would confound the text and structure of the Federal Rules in other
ways as well. First, it would conflate the distinction between a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss and a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment. As the
Supreme Court has made clear for decades, a summary judgment motion is the
device for testing pretrial whether the plaintiff has sufficient evidence to
support its claims.20 9 But if we graft an evidentiary requirement onto the
pleadings phase, a Rule 12(b)(6) motion would force a plaintiff, before any
opportunity for discovery, to present supporting evidence that ordinarily would
not be needed until a summary judgment motion was filed.2t0 Imposing on
plaintiffs a Rule 56 burden to oppose a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is textually
problematic given the distinct roles that the Rules anticipate for these
motions.
211
only for certain types of allegations. See supra note 35. Under the PSLRA, the targeted
allegation that the defendant "acted with the required state of mind" must be supported by
other allegations that "giv[e] rise to a strong inference," 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2006), but
the supporting allegations must themselves be accepted as true. To require evidentiary
support for every allegation, however, is inherently unworkable.
208. The hypothetical complaint discussed supra note 149 also confirms the fallacy of
requiring a complaint to provide evidentiary support for the allegations contained therein.
Imagine that the plaintiff in Twombly had alleged that the CEOs of each of the Baby Bells
reserved a private room at a high-priced restaurant in Bermuda in January 1996, and then
alleged a second-by-second transcript of exactly what was said by whom at the meeting as
they hatched their conspiratorial regime. If we truly define conclusory in evidentiary terms,
not even such very detailed allegations would be sufficient. They do not, after all, provide
any evidentiary support that such a meeting in fact occurred. They are just allegations that,
under an evidentiary approach, would themselves require some further allegations to suggest
their truth.
209. See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986); Mitchell v. Forsyth,
472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).
210. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 10, at 62 ("In reality, Twombly ... was a disguised
motion for summary judgment."); Hoffman, supra note 10, at 1240 ("It is now plain-if it
was not already-that Rules 12(b)(6) and 56 are hinged together doctrinally. As [Twombly]
saw it, if an antitrust plaintiff's complaint cannot survive summary judgment ... then why
delay the inevitable?"); Spencer, supra note 7, at 487 ("Twombly endorses parity between
the level of scrutiny applied to claims at the Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 56 stages."); Thomas,
supra note 10, at 1857 (noting that Twombly "established [a] standard[] for dismissal at the
motion to dismiss stage that [is] similar to the standard for summary judgment").
211. See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 10, at 1256 ("[T]reating a rigorous pleading
sufficiency standard congruently with summary judgment-that is, as nothing more than an
earlier but similar stage of judicial gatekeeping-is misguided."); Spencer, supra note 7, at
488 ("[1]t is inappropriate to apply the type of scrutiny applied at the summary judgment
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Second, Rule 11 undermines the idea that a complaint must identify
evidentiary support for its allegations. Under Rule 11, the filer of any document
certifies that, among other things, "the factual contentions have evidentiary
support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support
after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery."
212
Arguably, requiring evidentiary support at the pleadings phase would
contravene Rule 11 by mandating immediate dismissal of a complaint without
the opportunity Rule II envisions to use discovery to obtain the needed
evidentiary support. 213 Rule 11 explicitly recognizes that a complaint may
contain factual allegations that presently lack evidentiary support but "will
likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity, for further
investigation or discovery."214
One response to this critique could be that a stricter pleading standard
would just require the complaint to confirm a sufficient "likel[ihood]" of
obtaining evidentiary support in the future.2 15 But this view is based on the
mistaken premise that a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss-which seeks to test
merely whether the complaint provides the "short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief' required by Rule 8-is the
proper vehicle for testing Rule 1l's requirement that factual allegations "will
likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further
investigation or discovery." Rule 11 itself provides the procedural vehicles for
challenging an attorney's failure to comply with Rule 1 (b)-either a motion
for sanctions by another party,216 or an order to show cause issued on the
court's own initiative. 217 A motion to dismiss a pleading for "failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted ' 218 targets the "statement of the
claim"219 itself, not whether the attorney has undertaken the required
reasonable inquiry into the likelihood of obtaining evidentiary support. Using
Rule 11 as a basis for requiring supportive allegations at the pleadings phase
would, therefore, conflate two separate procedural issues, contrary to the text
stage to the pleadings of litigants that have yet to have access to discovery."). But cf Epstein,
supra note 10, at 82 (arguing that "treat[ing] the [Twombly] defendant's motion to dismiss as
though it set up a 'mini-summary judgment' was a desirable result given the nature of the
claim presented in Twombly).
212. FED. R. Civ. P. 1 (b)(3).
213. See Spencer, supra note 7, at 470-72.
214. FED. R. Civ. P. 1 l(b)(3) (emphasis added).
215. See Hoffman, supra note 10, at 1253-54 ("[l]mposing a plausibility requirement at
Rule 8(a)(2) is probably close-if not (at least sometimes) equivalent-to the Rule 1 l(b)(3)
proscription against asserting claims for which there is no evidentiary support and no
likelihood of evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further discovery.").
216. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2).
217. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(3).
218. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
219. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
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and structure of the Federal Rules.
220
Third, Form 11 's model negligence complaint-which "suffice[s] under
[the Federal Rules] and illustrate[s] the simplicity and brevity that these rules
contemplate" 22 ]-would seem to preclude any attempt to infer a requirement
that the complaint contain supporting evidence for its allegations. Form 11
alleges merely: "On <Date>, at <Place>, the defendant negligently drove a
motor vehicle against the plaintiff., 222 It does not require any level of
evidentiary support suggesting that the defendant was, in fact, driving
negligently. 223 It requires nothing more than an allegation that the defendant
was driving "negligently" when he struck the plaintiff.224 Other forms also
undermine the evidentiary approach. Form 18's complaint for patent
infringement, using the example of electric motors, deems it sufficient to
allege: "The defendant has infringed and is still infringing the Letters Patent by
making, selling, and using electric motors that embody the patented
invention." 225 Form 18 does not require any level of evidentiary support
suggesting that the defendant's electric motors, in fact, embody the plaintiffs
invention. It requires nothing more than an allegation that the defendant's
motors embody the patented invention.
Finally, an evidentiary theory cannot be reconciled with other Supreme
Court decisions that, as explained above, must be assumed to remain good
law.22 6 Swierkiewiez-the most recent example-squarely confronts and
rejects such an evidentiary approach. Swierkiewicz had alleged that he was
fired based on his age and national origin, but the lower court dismissed the
complaint for failing to "adequately allege[] circumstances that support an
inference of discrimination." 22 The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal,
instructing that federal courts "must accept as true all of the factual allegations
contained in the complaint"-including the allegation of discriminatory
220. See Hoffman, supra note 10, at 1254 ("Rule 11 is a certification and sanctioning
rule and not normally the vehicle for dismissing insufficient claims."). Tellingly, the
defendant in Leatherman attempted to justify a heightened pleading standard as "consistent
with a plaintiff's Rule 11 obligation to make a reasonable prefiling inquiry into the facts,"
but a unanimous Supreme Court rejected that argument. Leatherman v. Tarrant County
Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 167 (1993).
221. FED.R.CIv.P.84.
222. FED. R. Civ. P. Form 11, T 2.
223. But cf Bone, supra note 10, at 886 (arguing that the mere fact a car collided with
a pedestrian raises the specter of negligence because "drivers do not usually strike
pedestrians when driving with reasonable care, so the probability of negligence conditional
on a pedestrian being struck should be quite high"); Spencer, supra note 10, at 27 (arguing
that "the surrounding fact of the collision itself creates a presumption of impropriety").
224. See Bone, supra note 10, at 886; Spencer, supra note 10, at 27.
225. FED. R. Cv. P. Form 18, 3.
226. See supra notes 156-75 and accompanying text.




intent.228 This obligation is "without regard to whether a claim will succeed on
the merits. Indeed it may appear on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is
very remote and unlikely but that is not the test."229 Consistent with this
observation, the unanimous Court in Swierkiewicz rejected the idea that the
complaint must indicate the availability of supporting evidence or facts
suggesting that the allegations might be proven indirectly. The Court noted that
the discovery process might reveal evidence of discrimination that was not yet
known. 230 It therefore found it "incongruous to require a plaintiff, in order to
survive a motion to dismiss, to plead more facts than he may ultimately need to
prove to succeed on the merits if direct evidence of discrimination is
discovered" 231 even where the plaintiff is "without direct evidence of
discrimination at the time of his complaint."
232
For all these reasons-conceptual, textual, and precedential-Iqbal and
Twombly cannot be read to allow a court to disregard an allegation just because
its truth is not suggested by some other allegation. Such an inquiry may be
proper at step two of the Iqbal framework, but it is not grounds for refusing to
accept the truth of an allegation at Iqbal step one.
233
228. Id. at 508 n.1.
229. Id. at 515 (internal quotation marks omitted).
230. Id. at 511.
231. Id. at511-12.
232. Id. at 511. Twombly professed consistency with Swierkiewicz, but it also noted
that the Swierkiewicz complaint had "detailed the events leading to his termination, provided
relevant dates, and included the ages and nationalities of at least some of the relevant persons
involved with his termination." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The
Twombly majority did not, however, indicate that such information provided evidentiary
support for Swierkiewicz's allegation of discriminatory intent. Id. If that had been
Twombly's intention, it is hard to see how the Swierkiewicz complaint passes muster simply
by "detail[ing] the events leading to his termination, provid[ing] relevant dates, and
includ[ing] the ages and nationalities of at least some of the relevant persons involved with
his termination," id., yet it is not sufficient in Iqbal to describe the enormous impact that
Ashcroft and Mueller's policies had on Arab Muslim men. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.
1937, 1951 (2009).
233. Admittedly, Twombly and Iqbal at times emphasize the likelihood that the
plaintiff's allegations will be supported by evidence. See, e.g., Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949
("The plausibility standard ... asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully." (emphasis added)); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 ("Asking for plausible
grounds to infer an agreement does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading
stage; it simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will
reveal evidence of illegal agreement." (emphasis added)). But such language addresses the
plausibility of a claim after some crucial allegation is disregarded as conclusory; that
language does not shed light on what makes an allegation conclusory in the first instance. As
explained above, the distinction between the conclusory inquiry and the plausibility inquiry
is vital. See supra Part III.A. Indeed, there is a good reason why courts would be more
concerned about supporting evidence when assessing "plausibility" than when assessing
"conclusoriness." A nonconclusory allegation is subject to Rule lI's requirement that
"factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have
evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery."
FED. R. Civ. P. 1 l(b)(3); see also supra note 140 (noting how Iqbal equates "factual" with
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B. A Transactional Approach
One way to reconcile Twombly and Iqbal with authoritative pre-Twombly
texts and precedents is to define "conclusory" in transactional terms. A
plaintiff's complaint must provide an adequate transactional narrative, that is,
an identification of the real-world acts or events underlying the plaintiffs
claim. When an allegation fails to concretely identify what is alleged to have
happened, that allegation is conclusory and need not be accepted as true at the
pleadings phase. 234 This approach is to be contrasted with the approach
considered in the previous Subpart, which would require the complaint to
provide an evidentiary narrative, that is, information suggesting that the
allegations will indeed be proven true (under whatever probability threshold).
To illustrate the transactional approach, consider first some rather extreme
examples that were alluded to earlier. Imagine a complaint that alleges merely
that "the defendant violated the plaintiff's legal rights in a way that entitles the
plaintiff to relief." This allegation is conclusory in the transactional sense
because it does not indicate what actually happened; it provides only the legal
conclusion that the plaintiff's rights were violated. The same might be said of
hypothetical complaints alleging merely that "the defendant violated the
plaintiffs rights under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act" or that "the
defendant breached a duty owed to the plaintiff under state law and this breach
proximately caused damages to the plaintiff." These scenarios all state a claim
for relief, in the sense that the plaintiff would prevail if these allegations were
ultimately proven true. But they fail to provide an adequate transactional
narrative, because they do not identify the acts or events underlying those
allegations.
Another good illustration of a transactionally conclusory complaint is Dura
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo,2 35 a Supreme Court decision issued during
the five-year interval between Swierkiewicz and Twombly. The complaint in
Dura alleged that because of the defendant's misrepresentation, the plaintiffs
"nonconclusory"). Thus, Rule 1 1's enforcement mechanism can police nonconclusory
allegations that lack a sufficient likelihood of evidentiary support. But where a crucial
element of a claim is alleged in a solely conclusory fashion, the plaintiff has arguably made
no "factual contention" that would be subject to Rule 11 's requirement that there is or is
likely to be supporting evidence. If so, a court must assure for itself-via the plausibility
inquiry-that the complaint's nonconclusory allegations "raise a reasonable expectation that
discovery will reveal [supporting] evidence." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
234. Other scholars have recognized that pleadings ought to identify the events or
transactions underlying the plaintiff's claim. See Ides, supra note 10, at 607-09 (arguing that
federal pleading standards include a "Transactional Sufficiency" component that "requires
that the pleading contain a factual narrative sufficient to move the underlying claim from the
abstract assertion of a right to an assertion that is premised on an actual, identifiable event");
see also 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 1202 ("[P]leadings under the rules simply may
be a general summary of the party's position that is sufficient to advise the other party of the
event being sued upon .... ").
235. 544 U.S. 336 (2005).
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"paid artificially inflated prices for Dura['s] securities and suffered
damages. ' 236 The Court refused to accept as true the allegation that the
plaintiffs had "suffered damages." It noted that an "'artificially inflated
purchase price' is not itself a relevant economic loss" and that the complaint
had failed to allege that the "share price fell significantly after the truth became
known."237 For the plaintiffs in a case like Dura to have "suffered damages," a
distinct event must have occurred, namely, the movement of prices after the
misrepresentation was revealed. But the Dura complaint did not identify that
event in concrete terms. Thus the allegation that the plaintiffs had "suffered
damages" was transactionally conclusory.
The reasoning of Twombly and Iqbal support this understanding of what
makes an allegation impermissibly conclusory. The Court stated in those cases
that "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do"
238
and that Rule 8 "demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-
harmed-me accusation." 239 What makes an allegation a mere "formulaic
recitation of the elements," or "an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-
harmed-me accusation," is precisely the fact that it does not identify the
underlying events that give rise to liability. By contrast, consider some of the
pre-Twombly exemplars of liberal pleading. As cursory as Form 11 is, it
concretely identifies the liability-generating event: the defendant negligently
driving his car against the plaintiff.240 Form 18 does the same, identifying the
plaintiffs receipt of a patent for electric motors and alleging that the defendant
is "making, selling, and using electric motors that embody the patented
invention." 241 Swierkiewicz also provides a straightforward transactional
narrative: the plaintiff was employed by the defendant and he was fired because
of his age (fifty-three) and national origin (Hungarian).242
As elaborated in greater detail below, there might not be a precise formula
for distinguishing between an adequate and an inadequate identification of the
underlying events. 243 It would have been perfectly defensible if the Court had
drawn that line differently than it did in Twombly and Iqbal, and had instead
236. Id. at 346-47 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
237. Id. at 347.
238. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
239. Ashcroft v. lqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).
240. See FED. R. Civ. P. Form 11, 2 ("On <Date>, at <Place>, the defendant
negligently drove a motor vehicle against the plaintiff.").
241. See FED. R. CIv. P. Form 18, 2-3.
242. See Swierkiewicz Amended Complaint, supra note 29, $ 12 ("Mr. Swierkiewicz is
a native of Hungary."), 13 ("Mr. Swierkiewicz is 53 years old."), TT 17, 19 (describing the
positions the plaintiff held with the defendant), 37 ("Plaintiffs age and national origin
were motivating factors in [the defendant's] decision to terminate his employment."); see
also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002) ("Petitioner alleged that he had
been terminated on account of his national origin in violation of Title VII and on account of
his age in violation of the ADEA.").
243. See infra Part IV.F.
May 2010] 1335
STANFORD LAW RE VIEW
deemed the allegations in those cases nonconclusory and accepted their truth at
the pleadings phase. That said, the complaints in Twombly and Iqbal were-in
transactional terms-qualitatively different from Form 11, Form 18, and
Swierkiewicz.
244
Take first the crucial paragraph in the Iqbal complaint. Paragraph ninety-
six alleged that Ashcroft, Muller, and nine other defendants "each knew of,
condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject Plaintiffs to [harsh]
conditions of confinement as a matter of policy, solely on account of their
religion, race, and/or national origin.'245 The problem is not the cursory
allegation of discriminatory animus.246 The problem is the murkiness
surrounding what Ashcroft and Mueller actually did vis-6-vis Iqbal. Given the
Court's understanding of what was required for Bivens liability-that "each
Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions,
has violated the Constitution" 24 7-Ashcroft's and Mueller's individual conduct
was crucial as a matter of substantive law.24 8 Yet it is difficult to square
paragraph ninety-six's generic allegation with the series of real-world events
identified in the complaint. The "General Background" section of the
complaint24 9 identified a number of high-level decisions and policies, including
the policy of "holding post-September- Ilth detainees in highly restrictive
conditions of confinement until they were 'cleared' by the FBI" that was
allegedly approved by Ashcroft and Mueller.250 The complaint did not allege
that any of these policies were adopted or approved for invidious reasons.
25 1
244. This Article's attempts to distinguish the Twombly and lqbal complaints are not at
all intended to find fault with Twombly's or Iqbal's attorneys. In both cases, the complaints
were drafted before the Supreme Court's Twombly decision. And the Iqbal complaint was
drafted before the Iqbal majority restricted supervisory Bivens liability.
245. Iqbal Complaint, supra note 95, 96 ("ASHCROFT, MUELLER, SAWYER,
RARDIN, COOKSEY, HASTY, ZENK, THOMAS, SHERMAN, LOPRESTI, and
SHACKS each knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject Plaintiffs
to these conditions of confinement as a matter of policy, solely on account of their religion,
race, and/or national origin and for no legitimate penological interest.").
246. See infra Part IV.D.
247. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (2009).
248. This is an important distinction between Iqbal and Swierkiewicz. Because
respondeat superior governs employment discrimination claims like those in Swierkiewicz,
see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2006) (defining the term "employer" to include any "person
engaged in an industry affecting commerce ... and any agent of such a person"), the fact
that a plaintiff has been fired for invidious reasons is sufficient to establish a claim against
the company, regardless of which person at the company did the firing. This is in contrast to
the Bivens claim at issue in Iqbal, for which the individual defendant's liability depended on
that individual's own conduct. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948.
249. Iqbal Complaint, supra note 95, j 47-76.
250. Id. 69; see also Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1944, 1951 (quoting lqbal Complaint, supra
note 95, 69).
251. Indeed, the Iqbal majority emphasized that the complaint did not at any point
allege that the hold-until-cleared policy was adopted "'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,'
its adverse effects upon an identifiable group." lqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951 (quoting Pers.
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The next section of the complaint then described Iqbal's confinement. 252 Up
until this point in the complaint, Ashcroft's and Mueller's role in Iqbal's
confinement seemed to be their approval of the hold-until-cleared policy, which
was never alleged to have been adopted for invidious reasons. At paragraph
ninety-six, however, the complaint alleged that Ashcroft, Muller, and others
"each knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject
Plaintiffs to these conditions of confinement as a matter of policy, solely on
account of their religion, race, and/or national origin.'
25 3
From a transactional narrative standpoint, the Iqbal complaint potentially
raises a red flag. The "agree[ment]",254 in which Ashcroft and Mueller were
allegedly involved was a distinct event or transaction that, chronologically,
preceded the conditions of confinement that were imposed on Iqbal as a result.
Yet the allegation of this invidious agreement appears after the conditions of
confinement are described, and in a completely different section from other
decisions and policies that played a role in Iqbal's confinement. Is paragraph
ninety-six meant to allege that Ashcroft and Mueller, with discriminatory
intent, made a special agreement about Iqbal's detention distinct from the hold-
until-cleared policy? Is it meant to allege that Ashcroft and Mueller, with
discriminatory intent, adopted a generally applicable policy that targeted
individuals who shared Iqbal's religion, race, or national origin? Or is it meant
to allege for the first time that the hold-until-cleared policy referred to twenty-
seven paragraphs earlier was itself adopted for discriminatory reasons? A judge
might legitimately question whether paragraph ninety-six is truly grounded in a
real-world event or transaction, or is rather "nothing more than a 'formulaic
recitation of the elements' of a constitutional discrimination claim."
255
The Twombly complaint has similar problems. It alleged several examples
of "parallel conduct" by the defendants, including that they refrained from
competing "head-to-head" in each other's incumbent territories, 256 failed to
provide non-Baby-Bell competitors the same quality of service and quality of
257connection to the network, used billing methods that blocked these
competitors from auditing the bills they received from the defendants, 258 and
negotiated agreements with these competitors on unfair terms. 259 The
Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 254, 279 (1979)).
252. See Iqbal Complaint, supra note 95, 80-95.
253. Id. 96.
254. Id. The allegations that Ashcroft and Mueller "knew of' and "condoned" Iqbal's
harsh treatment would likely fail as a matter of law in light of Iqbal's restrictions on
supervisory Bivens liability. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
255. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1951 (2009).
256. Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint 39, Twombly v. Bell Ati. Corp.,







complaint then alleged in the crucial paragraph fifty-one:
In the absence of any meaningful competition between the [defendants] in one
another's markets, and in light of the parallel course of conduct that each
engaged in to prevent competition from CLECs within their respective local
telephone and/or high speed interet services markets and the other facts and
market circumstances alleged above, Plaintiffs allege upon information and
belief that Defendants have entered into a contract, combination or conspiracy
to prevent competitive entry in their respective local telephone and/or high
speed internet services markets and have agreed not to compete with one
another and otherwise allocated customers and markets to one another.
260
The phrasing and placement of paragraph fifty-one raise questions about
whether the alleged "contract, combination or conspiracy" is grounded in any
real-world acts or events. By definition, the agreement to engage in parallel
conduct must come before the parallel conduct itself. Yet the Twombly
complaint places the conspiracy allegation after the parallel conduct
allegations. And it phrases the allegation in a way that suggests that the
conspiracy derives from the parallel conduct, rather than the other way around.
The Twombly majority emphasized this fact in concluding that while "a few
stray statements [in the complaint] speak directly of agreement, on fair reading
261these are merely legal conclusions resting on the prior allegations." Justice
Souter wrote:
[T]he complaint first takes account of the alleged "absence of any meaningful
competition between [the ILECs] in one another's markets," "the parallel
course of conduct that each [ILEC] engaged in to prevent competition from
CLECs," "and the other facts and market circumstances alleged [earlier]"; "in
light of' these, the complaint concludes "that [the ILECs] have entered into a
contract, combination or conspiracy to prevent competitive entry into their...
markets and have agreed not to compete with one another."
2 62
Read this way, the Twombly plaintiffs had merely "rest[ed] their § 1 claim
on descriptions of parallel conduct and not on any independent allegation of
actual agreement among the ILECs." 263 Accordingly, the majority concluded
that the assertion of such an agreement in paragraph fifty-one was nothing more
than "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action."
264
One can certainly dispute the Court's view that paragraph fifty-one was
transactionally inadequate. The placement and phrasing of paragraph fifty-one
could be explained as an attempt by the plaintiff to indicate, consistent with
Rule 11, that the conspiracy allegation was one that did not currently have
evidentiary support but "will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable
260. Id. 51 (emphasis added).
261. Bell AtI. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007) (emphasis added)
(footnote omitted).
262. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 564-65 (alterations in original) (emphasis added).
263. Id. at 564 (emphasis added).
264. Id. at 555.
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opportunity for further investigation or discovery." 265 The Court's failure to
consider this possibility is unfortunate, but that potential mistake should not
obscure the fact that the Twombly majority's concern with paragraph fifty-one
was whether it constituted an "independent allegation of actual agreement"
rather than a mere "legal conclusion[] resting on the prior allegations." 266 Had
the complaint provided such an "independent allegation of actual agreement," it
would have been accepted as true without regard to its "plausibility."
C. Rule 8 and the "Plain Statement" Requirement
This transactional understanding of what "conclusory" means can be
situated in a new pleading paradigm: plain pleading. This approach finds
support in Rule 8's requirement that the complaint contain a "short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."267 One
definition of the term "plain" is "free of impediments to view," 268 as in the
phrases, "in plain sight" or "plain as day." The problem with the allegations
that the Court disregarded as "conclusory" in Twombly and Iqbal is that a key
act or event underlying the plaintiff's claim is obscured by the use of mere
conclusory language; that conclusory language fails to identify what real world
events are alleged to have occurred.269
More specifically, the plain-pleading paradigm breaks down Rule 8(a)(2)
as follows:
(1)A statement of the claim means an identification of the acts or events
that give rise to the plaintiff's claim. The statement does not need to provide
any kind of evidentiary support. The statement does not need to justify why the
plaintiff believes the events occurred as characterized in the complaint. It must
merely provide an adequate transactional narrative, that is, it must identify what
acts or events are alleged to have occurred.
(2)This statement of the claim must be plain: that is, "free of impediments
to view. ' 270 This means that the operative acts or events must not be obscured
by mere conclusory language. The complaint's failure to provide evidentiary
support for its allegations does not make them conclusory. An allegation is
impermissibly conclusory when it is necessary to establish a viable claim but
fails to identify a tangible, real-world act or event.
(3)The statement of the claim must show that the pleader is entitled to
relief, meaning that if the acts and events that are plainly identified occurred as
265. FED. R. CIrv. P. 1 l(b)(3) (emphasis added) (requiring that such factual contentions
be "specifically so identified").
266. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 564 (emphasis added).
267. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added).
268. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 947 (11 th ed. 2003).
269. See supra notes 245-66 and accompanying text.
270. COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 268, at 947.
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characterized in the complaint, then the plaintiff would be legally entitled to the
remedy requested.2 7' If the plainly identified acts and events are insufficient by
themselves (perhaps because some conclusory allegations were disregarded for
lack of plainness), then Rule 8 is satisfied only if the plainly identified acts and
events plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief. As explained above, however,
this plausibility inquiry makes the pleading standard more lenient, not less; it
allows a complaint to pass muster even if crucial elements of a claim for relief
are couched in mere legal conclusions. 272 The plausibility inquiry cannot
legitimately be read as allowing judges to reject allegations just because they
perceive them to be implausible.
This understanding of Rule 8 captures the two-part pleading framework the
Court employed in Iqbal: first, identify allegations that are conclusory and
disregard them; second, determine whether the remaining allegations, accepted
as true, plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.273 Conclusory allegations are
not "plain" and, therefore, cannot count toward "showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief." But all nonconclusory allegations must be accepted as true.
By defining conclusory in transactional terms, this taxonomy is able to
reconcile the apparent conflict between Twombly and pre-Twombly authority on
federal pleading.
2 74
The plain-pleading approach might even be couched as an attempt to
further refine what "notice" a defendant is entitled to at the pleadings phase.
275
As an organizing framework, however, it has a number of advantages over the
notice-pleading paradigm that prevailed during the decades before Twombly.
From a textual standpoint, notice pleading is an awkward fit with the text of the
Federal Rules. While the requirement of "a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief' 276 provides the defendant
some notice of the claim against it, Rule 8(a) does not suggest that notice about
271. The textual theory proposed here uses this phrase in precisely the same way as
Twombly and Iqbal. Both decisions confirm that Rule 8's requirement that the complaint
"show[] that the pleader is entitled to relief' comes into play only at Iqbal step two. See
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 ("The need at the pleading stage for allegations plausibly
suggesting (not merely consistent with) agreement reflects the threshold requirement of Rule
8(a)(2) that the 'plain statement' possess enough heft to 'sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to
relief.' (alteration in original) (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2))); see also Ashcroft v. lqbal,
129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) ("[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to
infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not
'show[n]'-'that the pleader is entitled to relief.' (alteration in original) (quoting FED. R.
Cv. P. 8(a)(2))). These quotes do not indicate that this phrase plays any role at Iqbal step
one, which is the only aspect of the Iqbal test that allows a court to disregard a complaint's
allegations at the pleadings phase. See supra Part III.B.
272. See supra Part IlI.A.2.
273. See supra notes 88-94 and accompanying text.
274. See supra Part IV.B.
275. See supra Part II.C.
276. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
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any particular aspect of the claim is necessary. 277 The plain-pleading paradigm,
on the other hand, is textually grounded in Rule 8(a)(2)'s requirement that the
statement of the claim be "short and plain." To be sure, the requirement that the
complaint identify the acts and events underlying the plaintiffs claim will
perform a valuable notice-giving function. 278 But the plain-pleading paradigm
is able to support that function without the textual problems of one that is
fixated on notice per se.
D. Some "Conclusory" Language Is Not Necessarily Fatal
A corollary to the transactional approach proposed here is that an
allegation may contain some language that, in isolation, might be characterized
as conclusory without the allegation being deemed "conclusory" for purposes
of Iqbal step one. One might say, for example, that Form 11 's allegation that
the defendant was driving negligently is a conclusory allegation.2 7 9 Similar
arguments could be made about Form 18's alle ation that the defendant's
electric motors embodied the patented invention,22 or the allegation that the
defendant terminated Swierkiewicz because of his age and national origin.
2 8 1
These allegations are not transactionally conclusory, however, because
they provide a basic identification of the liability-generating events or
transactions. Form 11 states that the defendant drove his car against the
plaintiff. Form 18 states that the defendant was making, selling, and using
electric motors. The Swierkiewicz complaint states that the defendant
terminated the plaintiffs employment. Once that transactional core is
adequately identified, certain qualities or characteristics of those events can
permissibly be described with what one might call conclusory language. Under
a transactional approach, a complaint need not further explain how or why an282
event is alleged to have a particular quality or characteristic. Form 11 does
277. See Clark, supra note 177, at 461 ("[W]hile a useful rule may perhaps be framed
in terms of notice, I think the Federal Rules follow a wiser course of stating a still more
general and, if you please, more legal requirement-'a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."' (citation and footnote omitted)).
278. See infra notes 310-13 and accompanying text (arguing that notice-giving is one
purpose of pleadings and that this Article's proposed pleading standard serves that purpose).
279. See FED. R. Civ. P. Form 11, 2 ("On <Date>, at <Place>, the defendant
negligently drove a motor vehicle against the plaintiff.").
280. See FED. R. Civ. P. Form 18 , 2-3.
281. See Swierkiewicz Amended Complaint, supra note 29, 37 ("Plaintiff's age and
national origin were motivating factors in [the defendant's] decision to terminate his
employment."); see also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S.
506, 514 (2002) ("Petitioner alleged that he had been terminated on account of his national
origin in violation of Title VII and on account of his age in violation of the ADEA.").
282. In a product liability case, for example, this distinction suggests that a complaint
is not deficient if it alleges in conclusory terms that an injury-causing product was
"defective." Assuming that the complaint identifies the event by which the product caused
the injury (e.g., an accident involving the product), the fact that the product was defective is
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not need to explain how the defendant was driving negligently.283 Form 18
does not need to explain how the defendant's motors embodied the patented
invention. Swierkiewicz did not need to explain why he believed the defendant
fired him for invidious reasons. 284 This distinction is the key to explaining why
the unanimous Court in Swierkiewicz so candidly acknowledged that its
approach would "allow[] lawsuits based on conclusory allegations of
discrimination to go forward. '285 It is permissible to allege a characteristic of a
transaction in conclusory terms, as long as the complaint identifies the core
content of the transaction itself.286 The complaint in Swierkiewicz provided a
merely a characteristic of something that was involved in that alleged event.
283. Accordingly, Twombly and Iqbal's insistence on "factual" allegations, see supra
note 140, should not be read to impose what was traditionally known as "fact pleading" or
"code pleading." See Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 574 (2007) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (describing how "the [1848] Field Code and its progeny required a plaintiff to
plead 'facts' rather than 'conclusions"'). Form 11, for example, would fail under a traditional
fact-pleading regime because it does not provide facts to support the allegation that the
defendant was indeed driving negligently. Id. at 576 (describing how the earlier version of
Form 11 (what was then Form 9) illustrated a break from fact pleading). But Form 11 clearly
provides some "facts." It alleges that the defendant drove a vehicle against the plaintiff at a
particular time and place. By providing this real-world transactional narrative, Form 11 thus
provides sufficient "factual" allegations that it must be accepted as true under Twombly and
lqbal, even though one aspect of the collision (that the defendant was driving "negligently")
is described with what "would have been called a 'conclusion of law' under the code
pleading of old." Id.
284. This approach is reflected in Rule 9(b)'s command that "[m]alice, intent,
knowledge, and other conditions of a person's mind may be alleged generally." FED. R. Civ.
P. 9(b). Yet it also explains why the mere ability to allege intent or state of mind "generally"
does not mean that every such allegation passes muster. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.
1937, 1954 (2009) ("Rule 9 merely excuses a party from pleading discriminatory intent
under an elevated pleading standard. It does not give him license to evade the less rigid-
though still operative-strictures of Rule 8."). The allegation must still be sufficiently
tethered to an adequately identified transaction in order to be accepted as true at the
pleadings phase. See id. ("Rule 8 does not empower respondent to plead the bare elements of
his cause of action, affix the label 'general allegation,' and expect his complaint to survive a
motion to dismiss.").
285. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514.
286. This line between an event's core content and its qualities or characteristics may
not be crystal clear in all cases, but the distinction is not an arbitrary or uncommon one.
Indeed, it is fundamental to basic preclusion principles. Res judicata typically bars any future
lawsuit that is based on the same events or transactions, irrespective of how those
transactions are characterized or what legal theory is used to justify recovery. See, e.g.,
Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 481 n.22 (1982) ("Res judicata has recently
been taken to bar claims arising from the same transaction even if brought under different
statutes."); 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24(1) (1982) ("[Tlhe claim
extinguished includes all rights ... with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series
of connected transactions, out of which the action arose."). This rule reflects the difference
between the core content of an event and its qualities or characteristics. If the plaintiff in
Form 11 loses his case when he proceeds on a negligence theory, preclusion would bar him
from filing a second lawsuit based on an intentional tort theory. If Swierkiewicz loses his
case when he proceeds on a theory of age and national-origin-based discrimination,
preclusion would bar him from filing a second lawsuit based on a theory that he was fired in
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straightforward transactional narrative, even though the allegation of
discriminatory intent-viewed in isolation-could be labeled conclusory.
287
E. A Complaint Need Not Provide Extensive Details About the Underlying
Events
Although the transactional approach proposed here would require the
complaint to identify the real-world events that give rise to liability, it would be
a mistake to construe this standard as requiring extensive details about the acts
or events that are alleged to have occurred-for example, exact dates, times,
locations, or which particular employees or officers of an institutional or
corporate party were involved. Those who believe that a complaint must
contain such details in order to pass muster might point to Form 11, which
identifies the date and location of the accident, 288 or the complaint in
Swierkiewicz, which identified the dates on which particular events occurred
and some of the corporate agents and officers involved.2 89 But it should not be
assumed that such information is always necessary in order for an allegation to
be accepted as true at the pleadings phase.290 Other form complaints provided
in the Federal Rules confirm this.29 1 As mentioned above, Form 18's complaint
retaliation for protected activity under Title VII. See, e.g., Manego v. Orleans Bd. of Trade,
773 F.2d 1, 5, 7 (lst Cir. 1985) (applying a "'transactional' approach to claim preclusion"
and holding that res judicata barred an antitrust claim that arose out of the same facts as an
earlier claim alleging violations of federal civil rights laws).
287. This recognition explains why the Court reached different results in lqbal and
Swierkiewicz, even though both involved seemingly "conclusory" allegations of
discriminatory motive. Jqbal did not conclude that allegations of invidious motive are
inherently conclusory unless other allegations in the complaint support the allegation.
Rather, lqbal found the whole of paragraph ninety-six of the complaint (which contained the
allegation of invidious motive) to be conclusory. The problem with the Iqbal complaint, as
explained above, was uncertainty about Ashcroft and Mueller's individual involvement in a
willful and malicious agreement to subject Iqbal to harsh conditions of confinement. See
supra notes 245-55 and accompanying text. The Swierkiewicz complaint, by contrast,
provided a clear transactional narrative: the plaintiff worked for the defendant, the plaintiff
was fired by the defendant, and the plaintiff's age and national origin were motivating
factors in his termination. The fact that respondeat superior governs in employment-
discrimination claims like Swierkiewicz (unlike the Bivens claim at issue in lqbal) means that
liability does not hinge on the conduct of any one particular individual. See supra note 248
and accompanying text.
288. See FED. R. Cv. P. Form 11, 2.
289. Swierkiewicz Amended Complaint, supra note 29, 19, 31, 33.
290. See, e.g., Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211-12 (3d Cir. 2009)
(reversing lower court's dismissal despite the Iqbal decision and even though "Fowler's
complaint is not as rich with detail as some might prefer"); id. at 213 ("Fowler is not
required, at this early pleading stage, to go into particulars about the life activity affected by
her alleged disability or detail the nature of her substantial limitations. Her complaint
identifies an impairment, of which UPMC allegedly was aware and alleges that such
impairment constitutes a disability under the Rehabilitation Act.").
291. With respect to Form 11, it should also be noted that the Forms provide what
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for patent infringement deems it sufficient to allege that "defendant has
infringed and is still infringing the Letters Patent by making, selling, and using
electric motors that embody the patented invention." 292 No details are required
about precisely when or where the making, selling, and using occurred, or
which of the defendant's officers or employees were involved.29 3 In Form 17's
complaint for breach of a contract to convey land, the breach is adequately
pleaded merely by alleging that "the plaintiff tendered the purchase price and
requested a conveyance of the land, but the defendant refused to accept the
money or make a conveyance. "294 No details are required about precisely when
or how these events transpired.
There is another textual problem as well. If Rule 8 were construed to
require additional details about events alleged in a complaint, then what
purpose would Rule 9(b) serve? Rule 9(b) requires, among other things, that
fraud allegations must "state with particularity the circumstances constituting
fraud., 2 95 Thus, under Rule 9(b), a complaint must allege "the date, time and
place of the alleged fraud or otherwise inject precision or some measure of
substantiation into a fraud allegation, ' 29 6 such as by specifying each statement
alleged to have been misleading, identifying the speaker, and explaining the
reason or reasons why the statement is misleading.29 7 To read Iqbal and
Twombly as rejecting allegations that lack additional details would, essentially,
import these same requirements into Rule 8.
F. The Line-Drawing Challenge
The line between allegations that do and do not adequately identify the
underlying acts or events may not always be clear. One could reasonably
disagree with the Court's holdings that the crucial allegations in Twombly and
"suffice[s]" under the Federal Rules, not what is necessary under the Federal Rules. FED. R.
CIv. P. 84.
292. FED. R. Civ. P. Form 18, 3. Form 18 suggests that a complaint in a product
liability case should not have to identify with precision each step in a product's chain of
distribution. Just as it is sufficient to allege that a patent infringement defendant has been
"making, selling, and using electric motors that embody the patented invention," id., it
should likewise be sufficient to allege that a product liability defendant made or sold the
product in question.
293. This may reflect the entirely sensible notion that the information required to
adequately allege a particular occurrence can vary depending on whether that information is
likely to be in the plaintiff's possession. See supra note 117. A plaintiff can be expected to
know at the time of filing when and where she was struck by an automobile (Form 11), but
ought not be expected to know precise details about a defendant's internal production or
distribution practices (Form 18).
294. FED. R. Civ. P. Form 17, 3.
295. FED. R. Crv. P. 9(b).
296. Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 200 (3d Cir. 2007).
297. ABC Arbitrage Plaintiffs Group v. Tchuruk, 291 F.3d 336, 350 (5th Cir. 2002).
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Iqbal were conclusory. 29 8 But uncertainty about how the federal pleading
standard will apply to particular complaints is nothing new. Such uncertainty
was also inherent in Conley's fair-notice standard, insofar as the Supreme Court
was never pushed to further define what "fair notice" meant.299 Ultimately, the
line-drawing challenge is unavoidable. As long as we agree that a complaint
cannot just allege that "defendant violated plaintiffs rights in a way that
entitles plaintiff to relief," courts will need to police what is and is not an
adequate identification of the events underlying a plaintiff's claim.
There are, however, encouraging signs that some federal appellate courts
are approaching this issue along the lines that this Article suggests. One
example is the recent decision in Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside,30 0 a disability
discrimination case. The Third Circuit squarely rejected the idea that a
complaint must somehow suggest the truth or provability of the allegations
contained therein. As to the allegation that Fowler was disabled, the court
wrote:
At this stage of the litigation, the District Court should have focused on the
appropriate threshold question-namely whether Fowler pleaded she is an
individual with a disability. The District Court and UPMC instead focused on
what Fowler can "prove," apparently maintaining that since she cannot prove
she is disabled she cannot sustain a prima facie failure-to-transfer claim. A
determination whether a prima facie case has been made, however, is an
evidentiary inquiry-it defines the quantum of proof plaintiff must present to
create a rebuttable presumption of discrimination.
30 1
The Fowler court also accepted the plaintiffs allegations that "she was
'terminated because she was disabled' and that UPMC discriminated against
her by failing to 'transfer or otherwise obtain vacant and funded job positions'
for her." 30 2 It held that these were "'more than labels and conclusions' or 'a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action"' 30 3 and concluded:
"[w]e have no trouble finding that Fowler has adequately pleaded a claim for
relief under the standards announced in Twombly and Iqbal.
30 4
A transactional approach has also been employed in post-Iqbal decisions
where the court ultimately deemed an allegation to be conclusory. The Seventh
Circuit's decision in Brooks v. Ross 305 involved the following allegation:
Plaintiff is informed, believes and alleges that the Defendants while acting in
298. See supra note 243-44 and accompanying text.
299. See supra Part III.C. As described above, this uncertainty permitted lower courts
to dismiss complaints at a remarkably high rate even before Twombly. See supra note 180.
300. 578 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2009). Ironically, this is the same decision that read
Twombly and Iqbal as overruling Swierkiewicz. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
301. Fowler, 578 F.3d at 213; see also id. at 214 ("As we have stated before, standards
of pleading are not the same as standards of proof.").
302. Id. at 212 (emphasis added).
303. Id. (quoting Bell Atil. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
304. Id.
305. 578 F.3d 574 (7th Cir. 2009).
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concert with other State of Illinois officials and employees of the Attorney
General's Office, Department of Corrections and Prisoner Review Board did
knowingly, intentionally and maliciously prosecute Plaintiff and Ronald
Matrisciano in retaliation for Plaintiff and the said Ronald Matrisciano
exercising rights and privile es under the Constitutions and laws of the United
States and State of Illinois.
3 0A6
In refusing to accept this allegation as true, the court emphasized the
complaint's failure to identify what happened, not its lack of supporting
evidence and not its cursory allegation of retaliatory motive. The court wrote:
"[T]his paragraph fails under Iqbal, because it is merely a formulaic recitation
of the cause of action and nothing more. It therefore does not put the
defendants on notice of what exactly they might have done to violate Brooks's
rights under the Constitution, federal law, or state law."
30 7
While reasonable judges may disagree over how to draw this line in
particular cases, 3°8 it is crucial that the inquiry focuses on whether the
complaint provides an adequate transactional narrative, not whether it provides
evidentiary support for its allegations. And courts must remain cognizant of
their obligation to avoid conflicts with either binding positive law (such as the
Federal Rules and their Forms) or precedent that has yet to be overruled (such
306. Id. at 582.
307. Id. (emphasis added). The Second Circuit's en banc decision in Arar v. Ashcroft
also seems to reflect this approach:
Arar alleges that "Defendants"--undifferentiated--"denied Mr. Arar effective access to
consular assistance, the courts, his lawyers, and family members" in order to effectuate his
removal to Syria. But he fails to specify any culpable action taken by any single defendant,
and does not allege the "meeting of the minds" that a plausible conspiracy claim requires. He
alleges (in passive voice) that his requests to make phone calls "were ignored," and that "he
was told" that he was not entitled to a lawyer, but he fails to link these denials to any
defendant, named or unnamed.
585 F.3d 559, 569 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc). The Arar dissenters, however, disputed the
majority's characterization of Arar's complaint as failing to identify culpable action taken by
particular defendants. See id. at 616 (Parker, J., dissenting) ("[Arar] also alleges ... that the
defendants were personally involved in his mistreatment both in the United States and
abroad."); id. at 594 (Sack, J., dissenting) ("[T]he facts of Arar's mistreatment ... were
pleaded meticulously and in copious detail. The assertion of relevant places, times, and
events-and names when known-is lengthy and specific.").
308. It is likely that further refinement of the federal pleading standard cannot
meaningfully occur in the abstract, but must rather be done in the context of particular kinds
of acts or events and particular claims. Cf Seiner, supra note 10, at 1041-53 (proposing what
complaints in employment discrimination cases ought to contain). Developing such
standards on a claim-specific basis might create some tension with the idea that the Federal
Rules are "transsubstantive." See generally Burbank, supra note 10 (criticizing
"transsubstantivity rhetoric" and arguing that "the foundational assumption [of]
transsubstantive rules" limits courts' flexibility in applying the Federal Rules in particular
substantive contexts). But even if one continues to insist on a transsubstantive pleading
standard, any such standard must ultimately be applied to specific cases and specific claims.
What is required to state a claim will naturally depend, at the very least, on what the
elements of that claim are. Such an approach would not render the pleading standard
fundamentally non-transsubstantive, any more so than the Federal Rules' numerous form
complaints undermine the idea of transsubstantivity.
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as Swierkiewicz). 309 These basic principles, if faithfully observed, will provide
a significant check on the ability of courts to overassert their power to disregard
allegations as failing to adequately identify the underlying events or
transactions. Going forward, courts might promote greater predictability and
certainty if, when they dismiss a complaint, they specify as precisely as
possible what is missing from a complaint's identification of the underlying
events. This practice would make transparent a court's expectations in the case
before it, so that a plaintiff may make an informed decision whether and how to
amend the complaint. It would also provide better guidance for future courts
and litigants who might look to that dismissal as precedent.
V. SITUATING PLEADING STANDARDS IN THE POST-IQBAL ERA
This Part provides a deeper theory of the role pleadings ought to play in
civil adjudication, and explains how this Article's approach allows pleadings to
continue to play their appropriate role in the adjudicative process. It then
confronts the relationship between pleading standards and discovery costs that
drives so much of the contemporary debate. It identifies some often-overlooked
considerations and suggests some alternative methods for managing discovery
more effectively.
A. The Purpose of Pleadings
Scholars have broken down the purpose of pleadings in a number of
different ways, but they might broadly be characterized as: notice-giving,
process-facilitating, and merits-screening. No approach to pleading will
309. See supra Part III.B. Not all courts have heeded this obligation. One example is
Hensley Manufacturing v. ProPride, Inc., 579 F.3d 603 (6th Cir. 2009), which upheld the
dismissal of a trademark infringement action because "the complaint does not allege facts
sufficient to show that ProPride's use of the 'Hensley' name creates a likelihood of
confusion as to the source of its products." Id. at 610. This reasoning seems in conflict with
Form 18, which permits a patent infringement complaint that alleges nothing more than that
the defendant's product "embod[ies] the patented invention." See supra note 225 and
accompanying text. An example from the product liability realm is Frey v. Novartis
Pharmaceuticals Corp., 642 F. Supp. 2d 787 (S.D. Ohio 2009), which refused to credit
plaintiffs' allegation of a design defect because "[t]hey have not alleged any facts that would
permit the Court to conclude that there was a defect in the design or formulation of
Trileptal." Id. at 795. This reasoning appears to rest on the sort of evidentiary approach to
pleading criticized above. See supra Part W.A.
310. Professor Richard Marcus, for example, describes the three purposes of pleading
as (1) "to assure the defendant of notice of the basis for the suit"; (2) to "set the parameters
for the ensuing litigation of the case"; and (3) "disposition on the merits," although for "only
a small percentage of cases." Richard Marcus, The Puzzling Persistence of Pleading
Practice, 76 TEX. L. REv. 1749, 1755-56 (1998). Professor Benjamin Spencer describes
pleadings as serving an "instigation function," "framing function," and "filtering function."
Spencer, supra note 7, at 490. But cf Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81
TEX. L. REv. 551, 554-57 (2002) (arguing that common law and code pleading systems
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perform all of these functions perfectly; they invariably involve trade-offs with
one another and with other systemic and societal values. 3 1 That said, this
Article's proposal would advance all three of these goals by requiring the
complaint to plainly identify the acts or events that form the basis of the
plaintiffs claim. Consider first the notice-giving purpose. The obligation to
provide a "statement of the claim" that is "plain"--i.e., not obscured by mere
conclusory labels-has the effect of informing defendants of the acts or events
that are the basis of the claim against them. Although the notice a defendant
must be given at the pleadings phase was an uncertain issue before Twombly
and remains so today, 312 notice remains a valuable function of the pleadings
phase from a policy standpoint. The plain-pleading concept better defines what
sort of notice is required-notice about the acts or events that, according to the
plaintiff, entitles him or her to relief from the defendant.
3 13
The plain-pleading approach also serves the process-facilitation function of
pleadings. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, many procedural issues
hinge on the "transaction or occurrence" that is the subject of the plaintiffs
claim: whether multiple parties may be joined together in a single lawsuit,
3 14
whether a defendant's counterclaim is compulsory, 315 whether a crossclaim is
served a number of functions, but under the Federal Rules the "only function" of pleadings is
to provide notice).
311. One could even imagine a system that has no meaningful scrutiny at all at the
pleadings phase. It could allow a plaintiff to begin a lawsuit merely by notifying a defendant
"I'm suing you," and then rely on other pretrial processes to perform the notice-giving,
process-facilitating, and merits-screening functions. Such a system would not be
fundamentally irrational, but its desirability would depend on how that post-pleading process
is structured and implemented.
312. See supra notes 177-80 and accompanying text.
313. To determine whether this quantum of notice is optimal would require considering
more than just the notice function. Arguments based on notice alone can be quite slippery.
One might even argue that the notice function justifies precisely the kind of strict pleading
standard that many attribute to Twombly and Iqbal. The statement that a complaint must
"give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests," Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) (emphasis added), is not implausibly read
as requiring the complaint to detail what evidentiary support the plaintiff has for the key
allegations. Cf Bone, supra note 10, at 900-09 (arguing that Twombly's plausibility standard
might be justified under a "process-based theory of fairness as reason-giving" that "treats
notice as a matter of political morality not contingent on other elements of the system").
Conversely, even a complaint that would fail under this Article's more lenient standard (for
example, one that alleges only that "the defendant violated the plaintiffs' rights under Title
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act") still provides some notice, particularly given the
defendant's ability to glean more information from the plaintiff through the disclosure and
discovery process. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a) (initial disclosure requirements); FED. R.
Crv. P. 26(b)(1) (allowing discovery into "any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any
party's claim"). Ultimately, then, other purposes of pleading-such as process-facilitation
and merits-screening-may do more work in justifying any particular pleading standard as a
policy matter.
314. See FED. R. Civ. P. 20.
315. SeeFED. R. Crv. P. 13(a).
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permitted,316 whether a third-party defendant may bring a claim against the
plaintiff,317 and whether a claim added by amendment relates back to the date
of the original complaint. 318 Because these examples are all issues that must be
addressed at the pleadings phase, it makes sense to require the complaint itself
to identify the acts and events-the "transactions or occurrences"--underlying
the plaintiff's claim. The plain-pleading paradigm also enables the complaint to
shed light on the preclusive effect of whatever judgment is ultimately reached
in the case. 319 Because res judicata typically bars future lawsuits that are based
on the same events or transactions as an earlier one, 32 requiring the complaint
to identify the underlying events helps determine the scope of preclusion.
By contrast, consider what would happen if courts were forced to accept
allegations that were transactionally conclusory, in that they fail even to
identify the acts or events underlying the plaintiff's claim. Imagine a complaint
that alleges merely that "the defendant violated the plaintiffs' legal rights in a
way that entitles the plaintiffs to relief." Or allegations that "the defendant
violated the plaintiffs' rights under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act" or
that "the defendant breached a duty owed to the plaintiffs under state law and
this breach proximately caused damages to the plaintiffs." How could a court or
litigant assess (for example) whether joinder of parties is appropriate or
whether a counterclaim is compulsory, when the complaint fails to identify the
acts or events upon which the plaintiffs' claims are based? The failure to
plainly identify the underlying acts or events would also complicate the
application of preclusion principles when a final judgment is reached.
Finally, the plain-pleading paradigm serves the purpose of enabling the
court to undertake preliminary merits-screening. If a court were forced to
accept as true even transactionally conclusory allegations-for example, that
"the defendant violated the plaintiffs' rights under Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act"-it would be impossible to determine whether the acts or events
that the plaintiff hopes to prove would even establish a viable claim. The
plaintiff may believe, for example, that Title VII protects him from being fired
for wearing an obscenity-laden T-shirt to his job as a Walmart checkout clerk.
If forced to identify the real-world event of his firing and the alleged reason for
it, the court could easily determine that the complaint "fail[s] to state a claim
316. See FED. R. Civ. P. 13(g).
317. See FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a)(2)(D).
318. SeeFED. R. CIv. P. 15(c)(1).
319. See, e.g., WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 1202 (arguing that pleadings should
"provide some guidance in a subsequent proceeding as to what was decided for purposes of
res judicata and collateral estoppel"); Spencer, supra note 7, at 490 (arguing that pleadings
should "identify the nature and contours of the dispute for purposes of... res judicata"). As
Charles Clark wrote, the complaint ought to "sufficiently differentiate the situation of fact
which is being litigated from all other situations to allow of the application of the doctrine of
res judicata, whereby final adjudication of this particular case will end the controversy
forever." Clark, supra note 177, at 456-57.
320. See supra note 286.
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upon which relief can be granted" 32'-Title VII, after all, would forbid the
firing only if it is "because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin." 322 But if the allegation that the defendant violated his rights
under Title VII must be accepted at the pleadings phase, that opportunity for
preliminary merits-screening is lost.
323
One should ask, of course, whether these same three purposes might also
be served by imposing a stricter pleading standard, such as one that would
require a complaint to contain evidentiary support for the allegations made
therein. From a notice standpoint, one could argue that such information would
serve the purpose of notifying the defendant of the evidentiary basis for the
lawsuit against it.324 One could also argue that requiring the plaintiff to identify
evidentiary support is valuable for merits-screening purposes, because it could
enable the court to inquire at the earliest possible stage whether the plaintiff has
sufficient evidence to prevail on the merits.
This enhanced notice and screening, however, would significantly interfere
with the third function of pleadings-to facilitate the adjudicative process.
There is perhaps no greater affront to the process-facilitation value than
preventing meritorious claims from ever seeing the light of day.325 Yet for
claims that depend on the discovery process to obtain supporting evidence, a
standard that requires such evidence at the pleadings phase would do precisely
that.326 Moreover, requiring evidentiary support at the pleadings phase is of
little benefit given the post-pleading pretrial process that the Rules set forth.
Details about how a plaintiff plans to support its allegations are the domain of
pretrial orders, disclosure requirements, and the discovery process. 327 To
321. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
322. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).
323. This is not to say that the transactional approach proposed here will perfectly
weed out unsustainable legal theories at the pleadings phase. If the Form 11 plaintiff were
relying on a legally incorrect view of what constitutes "negligentf]" driving (for example,
that wearing a green shirt constituted negligence per se), that would not be revealed until the
disclosure/discovery phase. See FED. R. Civ. P. Form 11 (deeming it sufficient to allege "On
<Date>, at <Place>, the defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against the plaintiff').
324. See supra note 313; cf Clark, supra note 177 ("[R]efer[ring] to the notice function
of pleadings .... is a sound approach so far as it goes; but .... [i]t cannot be defined so
literally as to mean all the details of the parties' claims, or else the rule is no advance.").
325. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REv. 181, 228
(2004) (arguing that "the system of pleading should not unduly interfere with decisions on
the merits").
326. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text; infra Part V.B.
327. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(2) (authorizing the court to, among other things,
"take appropriate action on... formulating and simplifying the issues... [and] identifying
witnesses and documents"); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) (requiring parties to provide "the name
and, if known, the address and telephone number of each individual likely to have
discoverable information-along with the subjects of that information-that the disclosing
party may use to support its claims or defenses" and "a copy-or a description by category
and location--of all documents, electronically stored information, and tangible things that
the disclosing party has in its possession, custody, or control and may use to support its
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impose a strict pleading standard that prevents plaintiffs with potentially
meritorious claims from reaching that phase would undermine rather than
facilitate the adjudicative process set forth in the Federal Rules.
More fundamentally from a process-facilitation standpoint, to require the
complaint to contain evidentiary support for its allegations may be conceptually
unworkable. As described earlier, a complaint can never truly provide
evidentiary support for the allegations contained therein, because even the most
detailed, particularized allegations are themselves just allegations.3 28 If courts
take seriously the idea that all allegations are conclusory when they are not
bolstered by evidentiary support, then every allegation will be deemed
conclusory, because any allegation offered to add additional support is merely
another allegation.
B. Pleading Standards and Discovery Costs
The previous Subpart does not discuss the reduction of discovery costs as a
potential purpose of pleading standards. It is a hotly contested issue whether
pleading standards should be tasked with performing that function. Discovery
costs are, however, a crucial part of the debate over how strict or lenient federal
pleading standards ought to be.32 9 From the litigants' standpoint, access to
discovery may present a zero-sum game. Stricter pleading standards help
defendants at the expense of plaintiffs, and more lenient pleading standards
help plaintiffs at the expense of defendants. 3 30 In this sense, the plain-pleading
paradigm proposed in this Article is unlikely to please those who saw Twombly
and Iqbal as an opportunity to tighten pleading standards significantly, which
would facilitate the early dismissal of lawsuits and avoid the discovery burdens
those lawsuits entail.
33 1
claims or defenses"); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (allowing discovery into "any nonprivileged
matter that is relevant to any party's claim"); FED. R. CIv. P. 26(0(2) (requiring parties to
"consider the nature and basis of their claims and defenses" when conferring and developing
a proposed discovery plan).
328. See supra notes 204-07 and accompanying text. Again, this is not an indictment of
all pleading standards that require additional details or supporting evidence. Heightened
pleading standards that are directed at discrete issues (such as the PSLRA, see supra note 35)
can be sensibly applied; but fatal conceptual problems arise if one seeks to apply such a
standard to every allegation in a complaint. See supra note 207.
329. See supra notes 113-22 and accompanying text.
330. As Professor Robert Bone framed the issue, a lenient pleading rule "reduces the
risk of an erroneous denial of relief-a false negative-by making it easier for meritorious
cases to be brought. But it also increases the risk of an erroneous grant of relief-a false
positive-by making it easier for frivolous suits to be filed." Robert G. Bone, The Process of
Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87
GEO. L.J. 887, 911 (1999) (citation omitted). A strict pleading rule, on the other hand,
"reduces the risk of false positives by increasing the filing burden for frivolous suits, but it
also increases the risk of false negatives by making filing harder in meritorious suits." Id.
331. Although it is beyond the scope of this Article, stricter pleading requirements
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Discovery costs are a serious and legitimate concern, however. This
Subpart offers a few observations on the relationship between pleading
standards and discovery costs. Any attempt to justify stricter pleading standards
on the basis that they avoid discovery costs will be fundamentally incomplete
unless it considers (1) the benefits of discovery (and hence the costs of
dismissing cases before discovery); (2) alternative measures-other than
pleading standards-for mitigating discovery costs; and (3) the added costs that
stricter pleading standards might impose on the pleadings phase.
As to the first point, access to the discovery process can allow a plaintiff to
uncover evidence confirming that a case is, in fact, meritorious. For many kinds
of claims, the information a plaintiff would need to satisfy a stricter pleading
standard is in the hands or mind of the defendant and, therefore, can be
meaningfully gathered only through the pretrial discovery process. 332 As
discussed earlier, heightened pleading standards place such plaintiffs in the
Catch-22 of needing court-supervised discovery to uncover the factual and
evidentiary details that would be required to get past the pleadings phase to
discovery. 333 The end result would be the dismissal of such claims before there
has been any opportunity to confirm their merit.334 To measure accurately the
costs and benefits of stricter pleading standards, one must include the costs of
thwarting such meritorious claims-costs that are suffered not only by the
unsuccessful plaintiff but also by society at large, given that civil judgments
promote deterrence more broadly.
The danger that stricter pleading standards will prevent meritorious claims
from seeing the light of day makes it crucial to consider alternative ways to
balance the costs and benefits of access to discovery. 33 5 One such alternative is
might also be applied to defendant's filings, such as answers or notices of removal. See, e.g.,
Hoffman, supra note 10, at 1246 (recognizing "the possibility that judicial interpretations of
pleading and removal could bear relevance to one another"). But see Romantine v. CH2M
Hill Eng'r, Inc., No. 09-973, 2009 WL 3417469, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2009) (rejecting
plaintiffs argument that the language of Twombly "requires that a defendant must set forth
more than labels and conclusions in its list of defenses").
332. See supra notes 116-17 & 122 and accompanying text.
333. See id.
334. It is particularly troubling that such dismissals would occur before the defendant
has been required to take a factual position on whether the plaintiff's allegations are true. See
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 572 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing
the majority for dismissing the Twombly complaint "without so much as requiring [the
defendants] to file an answer denying that they entered into any agreement"). This concern
implicates more than just abstract fair play. A defendant who merely challenges the
adequacy of a plaintiffs complaint via Rule 12(b)(6) makes neither "factual contentions" nor
"denials of factual contentions" regarding the plaintiffs claim and, therefore, is not subject
to Rule 11 's obligations (and potential sanctions) regarding such factual issues. See FED. R.
Civ. P. I l(b)(3), (4).
335. See Bone, supra note 10, at 876 ("[S]creening more aggressively at the front door
by demanding more from the complaint is just one approach, with its own costs and benefits,
and should be evaluated relative to other alternatives.").
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for judges to take advantage of the tools that the Federal Rules already give
them for managing the discovery process.3 36 Such tools allow judges to restrict
discovery where its costs are likely to exceed its benefits. 337 This more nuanced
approach avoids the sledgehammer of dismissal at the pleadings phase, which
denies all access to discovery, in favor of allowing courts to mitigate
discovery's costs while preserving its potential benefits.
Those who favor stricter pleading standards respond that, in practice,
courts are unwilling to adequately manage the discovery process. 338 Thus the
dangers of abusive discovery remain. Defendants who cannot get a case
dismissed on the pleadings have no choice but to endure costly discovery, and
plaintiffs may opportunistically file meritless claims in the hopes of a nuisance
settlement. The difficulty in obtaining appellate review of district-court
discovery orders exacerbates this problem by allowing judges to evade
correction when they fail to manage discovery adequately.
339
This argument deserves careful consideration, but it has its share of
problems. If a federal judge is willing to dismiss suspicious cases outright
under a heightened pleading standard, he or she should be willing to take the
more moderate step of imposing limits-perhaps even very strict limits-on
discovery as the Rules explicitly allow. 340 Conversely, it is hard to imagine that
a judge who would refuse to consider limitations on discovery despite a
defendant's concerns about undue costs would vigorously dismiss claims under
a strict pleading standard like the one many attribute to Twombly and Iqbal.
And such a judge could just as easily evade higher-court scrutiny; the decision
to deny a defendant's motion to dismiss a complaint is an interlocutory order
that typically may not be appealed (if at all) until after a final judgment is
reached. 34 1 Thus, the argument that strict pleading standards are needed
because judges are failing to use the Federal Rules' discovery-management
tools proves too much. For any legal standard to be effective, judges must
faithfully apply it. Pleading and discovery-management principles are no
different in this regard.342
336. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
337. See supra note 124 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(2)(F) and FED. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(2)).
338. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
339. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 3914.23; see also Transcript of Oral
Argument at 50, Ashcroft v. lqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) (No. 07-1015) [hereinafter Jqbal
Oral Argument], available at http://supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/
argumenttranscripts/07-1015.pdf (comment of Justice Alito noting that discovery-
management orders are "interlocutory discretionary decision[s] by the trial judge").
340. Admittedly, a judge who is motivated principally by a desire to reduce his or her
workload (rather than by an assessment of the likely merits of a particular claim) might have
a different preference ordering. Such a judge would be inclined to dismiss a case outright
but, failing that, would be unlikely to expend time and energy managing discovery.
341. See generally WRIGHT &MILLER, supra note 3, § 3914.1.
342. See Iqbal Oral Argument, supra note 339, at 61 (comment of Justice Breyer
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In any event, it is worth considering whether alternative procedural devices
might encourage courts to take a more active role in managing discovery. One
potential problem with the usual process by which parties seek, and courts
consider, ex ante limitations on discovery is that it can operate too much in the
abstract.343 Rightly or wrongly, judges figure that they can always deal with
objections to particular discovery requests on a case-by-case basis. But that
attitude can lead discovery costs to spiral out of control. Unrestrained parties
have an incentive to serve the broadest, most burdensome discovery requests
they can, knowing that the initial formulation is just the "opening bid." The
ultimate scope of discovery will be finalized through either negotiation with
opposing counsel (in which case making broad initial requests gives the party
more room to make concessions) or the intervention of a district or magistrate
judge (who may "split the difference" and, in doing so, implicitly reward
parties who make broad initial requests). The time and expense of litigating
these discovery disputes only add to the costs.
A better process might be one that enables defendants to target particular
issues in a complaint and have the court confront as a threshold matter the
appropriate quantum of discovery to allow on each issue. One way to
accomplish this under the current rules would be via Rule 12(d), which
empowers defendants topresent "matters outside the pleadings" when seeking
to dismiss a complaint. A defendant in a case like Swierkiewicz, for example,
could present affidavits showing that the true motive for firing the plaintiff was
legitimate and non-discriminatory. Rule 12(d) would then require the court to
treat the defendant's motion as one for summary judgment under Rule 56 and
to give all parties "a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is
pertinent to the motion." 345 Rule 12(d), therefore, spurs the court to consider
how much discovery as to this particular issue is appropriate before allowing
discovery to proceed more generally. If the evidence the plaintiff obtains during
that first phase is insufficient, then that motion should be granted-all before
noting that the application of pleading requirements "and every other legal question" depend
on judges faithfully implementing the relevant standard).
343. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c) (authorizing the court to issue orders regarding
numerous pretrial matters including "controlling and scheduling discovery"); FED. R. Civ. P.
26(f) (obligating the parties to confer and develop a plan that sets forth the parties' views on
how discovery should proceed before the initial scheduling conference with the court).
344. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(d).
345. Id.; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 56(0(2) ("If a party opposing the motion shows by
affidavit that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition,
the court may ... order a continuance to enable affidavits to be obtained, depositions to be
taken, or other discovery to be undertaken."). Rule 12(d) currently gives judges discretion to
refuse to consider matters outside the pleadings; if a judge "exclude[s]" such matters, then he
or she is no longer obligated to treat the motion "as one for summary judgment under Rule
56." FED. R. Civ. P. 12(d). Rule 12(d) might be a more robust tool for mitigating discovery
costs if appellate courts developed principles to cabin this discretion and thereby require trial
judges in more cases to implement what is essentially a form of phased discovery in
response to a Rule 12(d) motion.
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an answer has been filed, but after a limited opportunity for the plaintiff to seek
discovery on that particular issue.
346
Finally, the argument that a stricter pleading standard is needed to control
discovery costs overlooks the costs that heightened pleading standards can add
to the pleadings phase itself. First, a stricter pleading standard can encourage
costly, time-consuming litigation over pleading sufficiency. The perception that
Twombly and Iqbal raised the bar for federal pleading standards seems to have
had precisely this effect.347 Twombly has been cited nearly 24,000 times in less
than three years on the books, and Iqbal is being cited at a remarkable clip as
well.348 This result should come as no surprise. Because a complaint by
definition contains only "allegations"--not evidentiary support for those
allegations-it is hard to imagine a case where a defendant could not colorably
argue that additional "enhancement" or "heft" is required.34 9 There is very little
downside for a defendant who files such a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, and the
potential upside-immediate dismissal of the complaint-is huge.
This dynamic leads to a second problem. If required to bolster a
complaint's allegations with evidentiary support, plaintiffs will be encouraged
to pack the complaint full of "factual enhancement" in the hopes of satisfying
that uncertain (and arguably unworkable) requirement. Federal courts have
already expressed frustration with excessively lengthy complaints, 350 but one
can hardly fault plaintiffs who are up against Twombly and Iqbal as they are
conventionally understood. Yet the costs of requirin such information in the
complaint are likely to far outweigh the benefits. 3N Although there may be
346. In this sense, the Rule 12(d) method parallels an idea that has been suggested for
dealing with the Catch-22 that plaintiffs face under the heightened-pleading reading of
Twombly. Some courts have considered whether to allow limited discovery before ruling on
a Twombly-based 12(b)(6) motion in order to give the plaintiff an opportunity to discover the
information that such a pleading standard would require. See, e.g., In re Graphics Processing
Units Antitrust Litig., No. C 06-07417 WHA, 2007 WL 2127577 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2007);
see also Malveaux, supra note 12, at 68 ("[T]he plausibility pleading standard may require
that parties take some limited, preliminary discovery at the pleading stage ....").
347. See Hoffman, supra note 10, at 1222-23 (noting the frequency with which
Twombly was cited during its first nine months and concluding that "it is not altogether
inappropriate to assume defendants are now more regularly urging judges to intercept
complaints at the pleading stage"); Spencer, supra note 10, at 11 (arguing that under
Twombly "defendants will be emboldened to challenge the sufficiency of claims").
348. See infra app. tbls. I & 2.
349. See supra notes 204-07 and accompanying text.
350. See, e.g., Presidio Group, LLC v. GMAC Mortg., LLC, No. 08-05298 RBL, 2008
WL 2595675 (W.D. Wash. June 27, 2008) (dismissing plaintiffs 465-page complaint as
violating Rule 8(a) and noting that "'[birevity is the soul of wit.' [It] is also the soul of a
pleading" (quoting WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 2, sc. 2)).
351. Consider the complaint in Twombly. The plaintiffs alleged that an agreement to
restrain competition existed, but they also included a separate paragraph stating:
Richard Notebaert[,] . . .who currently serves as the Chief Executive Officer of Defendant
Qwest, was quoted in a Chicago Tribune article as saying it would be findamentally wrong
to compete in the SBC/Ameritech territory, adding "it might be a good way to turn a quick
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some value in revealing the kind of evidence that the plaintiff might use to
prove its case, the disclosure/discovery process already obligates plaintiffs to
disclose the evidence they intend to use to support their claims. 352 Forcing the
plaintiff to cram such information into the complaint, therefore, seems
unnecessary. It can also impose added costs on defendants. Assuming a
complaint contains enough "enhancement" to survive a stricter pleading
standard, each of those peripheral allegations must then be admitted or denied
by the defendant in its answer.
353
For these reasons, concern about the high costs of the federal discovery
process is not by itself sufficient to justify stricter pleading standards as a
policy matter. To be sure, discovery expense is one area that pleading standards
can impact. But the countervailing considerations detailed here confirm that
one should proceed with caution before letting the specter of discovery burdens
and nuisance settlements wipe out more than a half-century of liberal pleading
standards in federal court.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's recent decisions in Twombly and Iqbal have
generated fundamental questions about federal pleading requirements. Because
these decisions have emboldened defendants to seek dismissal of claims at the
pleadings phase even more aggressively than before, finding adequate answers
to these questions is crucial. This Article's solution reconciles prior authority,
fits with the text of the Federal Rules, and accomplishes the purposes that
pleadings ought to serve in the broader context of civil adjudication.
dollar but that doesn't make it right."
Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 256, 42. The Twombly
majority, of course, concluded that this allegation was not sufficient factual enhancement.
Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 568-69 & n.13 (2007). But assume for the
moment that this sort of allegation, perhaps in combination with other "enhanc[ing]"
snippets, might be enough to satisfy the conventional reading of Twomblyllqbal. What is
accomplished by requiring the complaint to contain such information? Not much. The
operative fact for a § 1 Sherman Antitrust Act claim is whether an agreement to restrain
competition existed, not whether a defendant's CEO made a comment like this to a
newspaper.
352. See supra note 327.
353. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(1)(B). Using the example supra note 351, it is hard to see
what is gained by requiring the defendant to admit or deny whether its CEO "was quoted in a
Chicago Tribune article" as saying what the plaintiff alleges. Even if the defendant were to
admit such an allegation, that would only establish what the article said, not what the CEO
actually said or, more importantly, whether the CEO had in fact engaged in an illegal
agreement with fellow telecommunications providers.
354. Even if courts adopt this Article's reading of Twombly and Iqbal (which would
preserve the fairly lenient pre-Twombly pleading regime, albeit in a new doctrinal context)
the argument that pleading standards must be tightened in order to mitigate discovery costs
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355. Reprinted with the permission of LexisNexis. Sincere thanks to Patricia Rodriguez
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U.S. 402 (1971) 5306
100 Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324
(1977) 5294
The following chart ranks Supreme Court decisions in terms of their rate of
new citing decisions by federal courts and tribunals. It measures the period
from June 30, 2009, through March 17, 2010.
Table 2: Fastest Rates of Citations By Federal Courts and Tribunals
Fed. Citation
Rate
Rank Case (per month)
1 Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) 769
2 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 757
(1986)
3 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) 737
4 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 193 7 (2009) 512
5 Thomas v. Am, 474 U.S. 140 (1985) 448
6 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 385
475 U.S. 574 (1986)
7 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) 327
8 Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) 272
9 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) 267
10 Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000) 229
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